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L Introduction
The environmental effects of modem development are increasingly being
recognized not only as local or regional problems, but as national and
international concerns.' Consider this statement by the Commission on
Environmental Cooperation:
1. See, e.g., COMM'NONENVTL. COOPERATION, THE NORTH AMERICAN MOSAIC: ASTATE
OF THE ENVIRONMENT REPORT 2-5 (2002) [hereinafter NORTH AMERICAN MosAIC], available at
http://www.cec.org/files/PDFIPUBLICATIONS/soe-en.pdf (discussing the environmental
relationships that interconnect North America and the need for these interconnections to be
recognized as North American issues, rather than national issues, in order to address
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Now more than ever, we live in an interconnected, integrated world.
Information and financial investments move electronically at the speed of
light. And the intercontinental movement and transfer of people, raw
materials, manufactured goods, invasive species, and diseases occur in
hours or days. The most remote ecosystems and the cells of every human
being contain persistent toxic substances made, traded, and released to the
environment by other humans. Animals and plant species, many much
older than we, are going extinct at unprecedented rates, often because of
decisions and actions taken by humans half a world away.2
The increased recognition of environmental problems as issues of
international-or transboundary-concem demonstrates the insufficiency of
national solutions to address certain environmental problems.3 The recognition
that national solutions are no longer sufficient illuminates a weakness in
international trade agreements that have traditionally emphasized liberalized
trade, while addressing environmental issues only minimally, if at all.4
Free trade agreements are premised on the idea that all nations involved in
the agreement benefit from trade that is free (or freer) from restrictions-that is,
an equal playing field.5 However, a free trade agreement no longer lives up to
its "free" character if the agreement allows one nation to gain a competitive
trade advantage over another by exporting the environmental costs-or
negative externalities-onto another nation. In other words: "If the basis for
the price of a product does not incorporate the costs of cleaning up the mess
environmental problems); Mark A. Drumbl, Environmental Supra-Nationalism, 59 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 289, 298 (2002) ("Environmental policy cannot just be a matter for local
government. Accordingly, environmental governance increasingly is operative at the regional,
continental, multinational, and even global level."); Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for
Transboundary Pollution, 46 DuKE L.J. 931, 931-34 (1997) (discussing the recognition of
pollution as a transboundary problem and yet noting that legal regimes, both within the United
States and internationally, have been slow to develop to address the issue of transboundary
pollution); David A. Wirth, The Uneasy Interface Between Domestic and International
Environmental Law, 9 AM. U. J. INT'LL. & POL'Y 171, 172-73 (1993) (noting the recent trend
towards resolution of international environmental issues by multilateral agreements that often
supplant national environmental legislation and questioning the effect this trend may have on
rights that are essential to domestic law, but often unavailable under international law).
2. NORTH AMERICAN MOSAIC, supra note 1, at 3.
3. See, e.g., id. at x-xi (noting the environmental connections between Canada, the
United States, and Mexico and also noting the increased degree to which the three nations are
working together on environmental issues).
4. Indeed, the North American Free Trade Agreement is considered the first free trade
agreement to contain substantive environmental provisions. BARRY APPLETON, NAVIGATING
NAFIA 191 (1994).
5. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., pmbl., Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA] (discussing the benefits of reducing distortions in
trade).
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made in the process of producing the product, the costs are being externalized,
that is, dumped upon other parties. "6 By exporting the negative environmental
costs of an action, a nation gains for itself and the polluter the equivalent of a
subsidy on that action.7 Put differently, the goal of creating an equitable
playing field for trade between the signatory nations is undermined if the
environmental consequences of economic action can be exported without trade
consequences.
The goal of an equal playing field can also be subverted if a nation
chooses to have lower environmental standards in exchange for the economic
advantage of cheaper production costs. Such a domestic policy choice can
produce the equivalent of a subsidy on that nation's production by reducing
environmental compliance costs. This can result in a distortion in trade by
making that nation's goods appear artificially cheap. This balance between
economics and environmental protection is, however, one that all nations must
strike. As long as the environmental costs of the domestic policy occur within
the nation setting that policy there is less of an unfair distortion; rather, that
nation is simply choosing to expend its "natural capital" in exchange for
economic growth. It is only when the negative environmental consequences are
exported onto other nations that such a decision begins to severely subvert the
purposes of liberalized trade.
Although there is a fundamental inequity inherent in gaining the benefits
of a free trade agreement while exporting the negative environmental
consequences to another signatory, this inequity has not yet resulted in a
solution in the North American context.8 A logical solution would be a
transboundary environmental impact assessment (TEIA) mechanism
implemented under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)9 to
6. Henry Shue, Global Environment and International Inequality, 75 INT'LAFFAIRS 531,
533 (1999).
7. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 1, at 967-84 (discussing the externalities that
transboundary harm causes and the disincentive this gives the nation who is causing the
externalities to address it because of the economic advantage they are gaining from the
externality, and thus the inherent disincentive to collective action that transboundary
externalities cause); Roberto A. Sanchez, NAFTA and the Environment, in MEXICO AND THE
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: WHO WIL BENEFrT? 96 (Victor Bulmer-Thomas et
al. eds., 1994) (noting that opponents of NAFIFA view lax enforcement in Mexico as creating
"effects similar to those of subsidies, attracting production and jobs, and distorting trade").
8. See infra Part V (noting that despite intentions to address the issue of transboundary
environmental impact assessment in the environmental side agreement to NAFTA, no legal
framework to implement transboundary environmental impact assessment has been developed).
9. NAFTA, supra note 5. An interesting feature of NAFTA is that the environmental
effects of a North American free trade area were never subject to an Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). DANIEL McGRAw,
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ensure that nations are on an equal footing with regard to exported
environmental harm. To this purpose, Part II of this Note first examines the
potential for transboundary environmental harms in North America. 10 Part HI
then considers the possible benefits of a TEIA mechanism in mitigating or
reducing that harm."
Part Ill compares the domestic environmental impact assessment (ELA)
provisions of the three member nations of NAFTA: the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in the United States; the Canadian
Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA) in Canada; and the environmental
impact assessment mechanism implemented under La Ley General de
Equilibrio Ecologico y la Proteccion al Ambiente (Ecology Law) in Mexico.
12
Although both the Mexican and Canadian EIA procedures are in large part
based on NEPA, there are some important differences between the three laws.13
Of particular importance to this Note is that the Canadian Environmental
Assessment Act is the only one of the three laws with any substantial
application to transboundary environmental harm. 14 The differences between
the domestic EIA laws mean that transboundary harms will not be treated
equally across North America, even though the economic products for which
those environmental harms are created will receive the benefits of North
American free trade.
Part IV considers the potential legal mechanisms for addressing the lack of
TEIA within North America. 15 There are several possible avenues to address
the problems posed by transboundary harm between the trading partners of
NAFTA AND THE ENVIRONMENT: SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS 9 (1995). Although environmental
assessment occurred, it was not conducted according to the requirements of NEPA. Id. Various
environmental groups sued, attempting to force compliance with NEPA in the environmental
assessment, but lost in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Id. (citing Public
Citizen v. United States Representative, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
10. See infra Part ll.A (examining the potential for transboundary harm within North
America).
11. See infra Part H.B (considering the possible benefits that environmental impact
assessment can have in both reducing environmental harms and making the process of
environmental decision-making more transparent).
12. See infra Part m (examining the three domestic laws generally and their potential
application to transboundary environmental impact assessment).
13. See infra Parts IH.B-C (examining the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act and
the Mexican Ecology Law and comparing them to the American National Environmental Policy
Act).
14. See infra Part m.B.7 (discussing the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act's
transboundary application).
15. See infra Part IV (examining the potential legal frameworks through which a
transboundary environmental impact assessment mechanism could be implemented).
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NAFTA. The first option is to extend existing domestic EIA legislation to
encompass transboundary impacts. As discussed in Part II, there are serious
limitations and differences in the domestic EIA laws that make this option
unappealing. The adoption of substantive international law on TEIA is the
most comprehensive option.16 A similar option is the adoption of a multilateral
treaty on TEIA like the Espoo Convention.1 7 Another option is to extend an
existing bilateral environmental treaty-such as the Boundary Waters Treaty or
the Agreement on Co-operation for the Protection and Improvement of the
Environment in the Border Area-to include a TEIA procedure. 8 The final
option considered in this Note is expanding the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) to include a TEIA procedure.19 Part V
argues that extending the NAAEC-the environmental side agreement to
NAFTA-to include a TEIA procedure is the most effective way to address
20transboundary harm in North America.
II. The Need for Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment
Henry Shue has aptly illustrated the problem of externalities-and the
need for internalization of externalities-with a simple childhood reference:
All over the world parents teach their children to clean up their own mess.
This simple rule makes good sense from the point of view of incentive: if
one learns that one will not be allowed to get away with simply walking
away from whatever messes one creates, one is given a strong negative
incentive against making messes in the first place. Whoever makes the
mess presumably does so in the process of pursuing some benefit-for a
child, the benefit may simply be the pleasure of playing with the objects
that constitute the mess. If one learns that whoever reaps the benefit of
making the mess must also be the one who pays the cost of cleaning up the
16. See infra Part IV.A (examining the potential of the International Law Commission's
Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm).
17. See infra Part IV.B (examining the potential for the North American nations to join
the Espoo Convention or to adopt the International Law Commission's (ILC) Draft Articles on
Prevention of Transboundary Harm).
18. See infra Part IV.C (examining the La Paz Agreement and the Boundary Waters
Treaty and their limitations in the context of transboundary environmental impact assessment).
19. See infra Part IV.D (examining the advantages and disadvantages of implementing a
transboundary environmental impact assessment mechanism under the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation).
20. See infra Part V (discussing the potential advantages and disadvantages to using the
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation as the legal framework for
implementing transboundary environmental impact assessment).
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mess, one learns at the very least not to make messes with costs that are
greater than their benefits.
2
This simple idea is a remarkably effective analogy for the issue of
transboundary harm. If the "mess"-transboundary harn-is not cleaned up by
the nation producing it, then it has been externalized onto the nation suffering
the harm. Under these circumstances, the cost of the economic action is not
accurate because some of the costs have been externalized.
The externality problem is related to, but also separate from, a larger issue:
free trade agreements that address economic trade concerns while failing to
equalize or address the differing levels of environmental protection required by
member nations.22 Indeed, the North American Free Trade Agreement is
considered the first free trade agreement to address substantive environmental
issues.23 Differing environmental standards between signatories to a free trade
agreement can give the nation with lower environmental standards a
competitive economic advantage over other signatories to the free trade
agreement.24 In theory, this could set up a "race to the bottom" between the
signatories to the free trade agreement, where each nation will be under an
economic incentive to reduce environmental protection to the level of the least
protective signatory nation.25 In most cases, however, this economic
"advantage" is the result of a choice between domestic economic development
and domestic environmental protection. However one feels about the
appropriateness of this choice, so long as both the benefit and harm resulting
21. Shue, supra note 6, at 533.
22. See, e.g., GARY CLYDE HuFBAUER JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, NAFA: AN AssEssMENT 95
(1993) (discussing the "green" character of NAFTA relative to other trade agreements and
environmentalists' continuing complaint that NAFTA should include provisions providing that
lax environmental laws or environmental regulation, or lax enforcement of those laws, should
constitute unfair trade practices that could give rise to trade remedies).
23. APPLETON, supra note 4, at 191.
24. As a simple example, if Nation A requires industry to pay an X percent tax on
emissions of a certain pollutant and Nation B requires industry to pay a tax on emissions of that
same pollutant that is less than X, industry in Nation B will have lower operating cost due to the
lower environmental standard of Nation B and thus will have, all other factors being equal, a
competitive advantage relative to industry in Nation A.
25. See RICHARD J. LAZARus, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 146-47 (2004)
(discussing the internationalization of environmental law and the difficulties that are presented
to international trade by differing environmental standards among nations). American
environmental law sought to avoid a similar situation between the states by creating national
standards for many environmental concerns rather than leaving it to the states individually. Id.
at 92; see also Sanchez, supra note 7, at 95 (discussing the concerns that NAFTA caused to
environmentalists, particularly with reference to environmental conditions in Mexico).
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from that decision occur within that nation, the decision is a matter of domestic
policy solely within that nation's sovereign discretion.26
The environmental effects become more problematic, however, when they
occur across an international border, thereby giving one nation a competitive
edge by forcing another to suffer the environmental consequences of
development. Thus, in the case of transboundary environmental effects, the
rationalization that it is a matter of domestic policy of that nation breaks down
because the choice is now between domestic economic development and
foreign environmental harm.27 Given the choice between domestic economic
development and foreign environmental harm, it would be rare indeed for a
nation to choose foreign environmental quality over domestic economic growth.
These choices and the potential for transboundary environmental harm are of
particular concern when the nation causing environmental harm has a free trade
agreement with the nation receiving the environmental harm.
A. The Potential for Transboundary Harm in North America
As noted by Richard Lazarus, even in the domestic context, the temporal
and spatial distance that can occur between an activity and its environmental
effects can be enormous. 28 The greater the distance-either temporal or
spatial-between an activity and its environmental effects, the more difficult it
becomes, politically, to make the case for environmental protection:
[TIhe tremendous spatial and temporal dimensions associated with
ecological injury create tremendous impediments to effective political
organization in favor of environmental protection. The pool of those
adversely affected is simply too spread out over space and time to
effectively organize for collective action. Future victims don't yet know of
the damage and might not yet even be born, and present victims are
unlikely to understand the source of their harm given the extraordinary
complexity of the natural environment and the associated scientific
uncertainty.... A [political] candidate seeking elected office based on an
environmental agenda that is not premised on traditional notions of
26. See, e.g., North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., pmbl., Sept. 8-14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1484 (effective Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAAEC],
reprinted in MCGRAw, supra note 9, at 81 ("Reaffirming the sovereign right of States to exploit
their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and development policies .... ").
27. See, e.g., id., pmbl., reprinted in McGRAw, supra note 9, at 81 ("Reaffirming the...
responsibility [of States] to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction.").
28. LAZARus, supra note 25, at 41.
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economic growth, but instead on the imposition of short-term limits with
the prospect of widely dispersed gain in the distant future, is substantially
disadvantaged within the political system.
29
A spatial gap between environmental cause and effect creates a natural
incentive for businesses to "locate and/or operate facilities in a way that
export[s] pollution to other jurisdictions. 30  Changes in technologies and
economies have allowed the spatial and temporal distance to grow both
between the decisionmaker and the environmental effects of the decision, and
between the consumer and the environmental effects of the product being
consumed. 31 The incentive for businesses to export pollution also applies to
state regulators who have an incentive to locate development so that the
environmental harms are exported. In this way states are able to meet state
environmental regulations while the economic benefits remain within the
polluting state.32 These principles apply at least as strongly in the
transboundary (or transnational) context. Thus, in order for transboundary
environmental effects to be addressed effectively, regulation should occur at the
same jurisdictional level as the environmental effects: national regulation to
address interstate pollution and multinational treaties to address transnational
pollution.
North America constitutes a vast and interconnected system-physically,
ecologically, and economically. As noted by one commentator, "one result of
having a five-thousand-mile border is that the United States and Canada have a
lot of trans-boundary environmental problems."3 3 If anything the situation on
the United States-Mexico border is at least as troubling.34 This includes human
movement and the flow of commerce between the nations as well as the most
basic of environmental connections-those of the air and water cycles:
Many ecological connections link the countries of North America.
Migratory species, transboundary air and water pollution, international
trade, and the transboundary movement of people are examples.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 143.
31. Id. at 213; see also id. at 226 (discussing the difficulty for consumers to see the
environmental harm caused by service industries as contrasted with industrial facilities or
resource extraction industries).
32. Id. at 143.
33. John Knox, Federal, State and Provincial Interplay Regarding Cross-Border
Environmental Pollution, 27 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 199, 199 (2001).
34. See, e.g., Kelly L. Reblin, Comment, NAFTA and the Environment: Dealing With
Abnormally High Birth Defect Rates Among Children of Texas-Mexico Border Towns, 27 ST.
MARY's L.J. 929, 934-40 (1996) (discussing the environmental harms that have resulted on
both sides of the border from the maquiladora program).
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Watersheds both delineate and cross jurisdictional boundaries. Ecoregions
typically transcend political borders. The CEC's report on Continental
Pollutant Pathways highlighted an important category of transboundary,
continental, and even global connections.35
To understand the types of transboundary harms that are possible within North
America, we need look no further than the examples of transboundary harm
that have already occurred within North America.
Acid rain is one of the most prominent examples of transboundary harm
that has already had a dramatic effect on the North American landscape.3 6 Air
pollution from the American Midwest traveled to the eastern Canadian
provinces and Northeastern States while some pollution likewise traveled from
Canada into the Northeastern States, and precipitated in the form of acid rain,
causing damage to property, forests, and particularly to lakes.37 The
transboundary harm caused by acid rain resulted in the signing of the Canada-
United States Agreement on Air Quality in 1991, resulting in substantial
progress in addressing acid rain.38
Water quantity and quality is another area where transboundary effects can
have enormous impact. Pollution in the Great Lakes resulted in the signing of
the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements in 197239 and 1978.40 Similarly,
the enormous amount of water drawn from the Colorado River to support the
water needs of the American Southwest has resulted in a huge reduction in the
41quantity of water reaching Mexico. Mexican communities that once relied on
35. NORTH AMERICAN MosAIc, supra note 1, at vi.
36. See generally Mark L. Glode & Beverly Nelson Glode, Transboundary Pollution:
Acid Rain and United States-Canada Relations, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (1993)
(discussing the transboundary problems with acid rain in North America); Ophelia Eglene,
Transboundary Air Pollution: Regulatory Schemes & Interstate Cooperation, 7 ALB. L. ENvTL.
OUTLOOK 129 (2002) (discussing transboundary air pollution); Jon Ricci, Comment,
Transboundary Air Pollution Between Canada and the United States: Paper Solutions to a
Real Problem, 5 D.C. L.J. INT'L L. & PRAc. 305 (1996) (same).
37. Ricci, supra note 36, at 306.
38. Id. at 314-16; Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of Canada on Air Quality, U.S.-Can., Mar. 13, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 676,
available at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/usca/agreement.html.
39. Agreement Between the United States of America and Canada on Great Lakes Water
Quality, U.S.-Can., Apr. 15, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 301, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 694.
40. Agreement Between the United States of America and Canada on Great Lakes Water
Quality, U.S.-Can., Nov. 22, 1978, 30 U.S.T. 1383, available at http://www.epa.gov/glnpo/
glwqa/1978/index.html.
41. See, e.g., Nikolai Frant, Comment, Developments in Transboundary Water, 2002
COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 91, 92-94 (discussing the conflicts arising between water
users on both sides of the United States-Mexico border); David H. Getches, Water Management
in the United States and the Fate of the Colorado River Delta in Mexico, 11 U.S.-MEx. L.J.
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the waters of the Colorado have had to adapt to a world where, in dry years, the
Colorado River, one of the mightiest in North America, may not even reach the
ocean. 42
In addition, there are concerns that, as water becomes more scarce-and
therefore more expensive-in the American Southwest, water intensive
industries will relocate to Northern Mexico to avoid the high costs and
increased regulation of water in the United States.43 Because fresh water is
distributed unevenly across North America," water is likely to become an
increasingly important issue as water demands continue to increase, particularly
in areas such as the American Southwest.45 Indeed, the Commission for
Environmental Cooperation considers that the "lack of comprehensive,
cooperative management for transboundary groundwater resources [on the
United States-Mexico border] promises to become one of the most pressing
challenges of the [twenty-first] century. 
46
There are numerous smaller-scale issues of transboundary harm that affect
North America on a daily basis. For instance, an issue that contributed to the
genesis of this Note was the government of British Columbia's attempted sale
of mineral rights for development of coalbed methane resources directly north
of the British Columbia-Montana border. Although the governor of Montana
was concerned that such development would adversely affect the water quality
107, 108 (2003) (noting that by the time the Colorado River reaches the Colorado River Delta
"there were usually just braids of moist sand").
42. Getches, supra note 41, at 108.
43. See Sanchez, supra note 7, at 110 (discussing the possible effects of NAFTA on water
use in northern Mexico).
44. Indeed, Canada is home to ten times more fresh water on a per capita basis than the
United States and twenty times more than Mexico. NORTH AMERICAN MOSAIC, supra note 1, at
26 (citing WRI ET AL., WORLD RESOURCES 1998-99, A GUIDE TO THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT:
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND HUMAN HEALTH (1998)).
45. See generally Carlos Marin, Bi-National Border Water Supply Issues from the
Perspective of the IBWC, 11 U.S.-MEx. L.J. 35 (2003) (discussing the 1.5 million acre-feet
water deficit that Mexico is running on its obligations of water to the United States); Thomas L.
Sansonetti & Sylvia Quast, Not Just a Western Issue Anymore: Water Disputes in the Eastern
United States, 34 CUMB. L. REV. 185 (2003) (noting that the issues of water scarcity which are
generally associated with the American Southwest are also becoming issues in the eastern
United States); Harrison C. Dunning, California Water: Will There Be Enough?, 25 ENVIRONS
ENvL. L. & POL'Y J. 59 (2002) (discussing the current and future conflicts over water for
agricultural and environmental uses in California); Josh Clemons, Interstate Water Disputes: A
Road Map for States, 12 SE. ENVTL. L.J. 115 (2004) (discussing allocation of water and disputes
among states over water rights).
46. NORTH AMERICAN MOSAIC, supra note 1, at 28 (citing COMM'N ON ENvTL.
COOPERATION, NORTH AMERICAN TRANSBOUNDARY INLAND WATER REPORT (1998) (unpublished
report)).
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in the Flathead River, which flows from British Columbia into Montana and
along the edge of Glacier National Park, the British Columbia government
refused to order an EIA. Although there was the potential that the development
in Canada would adversely affect water quality in Glacier National Park-a
place many consider one of the most pristine wildernesses in the continental
United States-American authorities had no power to require an EIA for the
project.47 This is just one small example where the lack of a mechanism for a
TEIA could have resulted in substantial and possibly irreparable environmental
damage within the United States, without the potential harm ever even being
considered.
B. The Value of Environmental Impact Assessment in Reducing
Environmental Harm
Assessment of projects to determine their environmental impacts and
the presentation of this information to both the public and decisionmakers
are powerful tools for ensuring that, at least from the decisionmaker' s point
of view, the environmental harms of a project do not outweigh its benefits.
Indeed, one Canadian commentator suggests that "environmental
assessment is potentially the most powerful tool" for protecting the
environment,48 while the Supreme Court of Canada has described
environmental assessment as "a planning tool that is now generally
regarded as an integral component of sound decision-making. ' '49  A
commentator on NEPA, the principal American EIA law, noted that it has
"resulted in substantial changes in agency behavior with positive effects on
environmental protection,, 50 and one of the authors of the law described it
as "the most important and far-reaching environmental and conservation
measure ever enacted by the Congress." 5 As discussed below in Part III.A,
requiring projects to undergo an EIA process can have substantial positive
environmental effects both by presenting information on the potential
47. Andrew Nikiforuk, Going, Going... Gone, CANADIAN Bus. MAG. ONLINE, Sept.
2004, http://www.canadianbusiness.com/managing/strategy/article.jsp?content=20040913_616
62_61662.
48. DAVID R. BOYD, UNNATURAL LAW 149 (2003) (quoting STEPHEN HAZELL, CANADA V.
THE ENVIRONMENT: FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 1984-1998 (1999)).
49. Id. at 149 (citing Friends of the Oldman River v. Canada (Minister of Transport),
[1992] S.C.R. 3, 71).
50. LAZARUS, supra note 25, at 85.
51. VALERIE M. FOGLEMAN, GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 1
(1990) (quoting 115 CONG. REC. 40, 416 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Jackson)).
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environmental harms to the decisionmaker and by involving the public and
interested groups in the decisionmaking process. Simply put, effects of the
EIA laws "cannot be overstated.,
52
There are essentially two types of environmental assessment laws:
those that are strictly procedural and those that have substantive
requirements.53 American environmental assessment law relies solely on its
procedural requirements.54 This means that, in theory, a project can
proceed no matter how great the environmental harm caused so long as all
the required environmental assessment procedures have been followed.55
In practice, however, investigating the environmental impacts and
presenting that information to the decisionmaker and the public will affect
the decision, with positive environmental consequences.56 The Mexican
and Canadian counterparts, by contrast, have substantive requirements in
addition to their procedural requirements; that is, if the level of
environmental harm caused by a project is too great, the project will not be
allowed to proceed.57 Both types of laws can be effective in deterring
environmental harm. Indeed, although environmentalists have lamented its
lack of substantive requirements, NEPA, with only procedural
requirements, is considered one of the most effective environmental laws in
58history.
52. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA: LAW AND LTGATON ix (2004).
53. Compare infra Part HL.A (discussing American EIA law, which has been interpreted
to have only procedural requirements), with infra Part IL.B (discussing Canadian EIA law,
which has a substantive requirement), and infra Part III.C (discussing Mexican EIA law, which
also has a substantive requirement).
54. See infra Part ILI.A (discussing the requirements of NEPA); infra notes 168-71 and
accompanying text (noting the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation that NEPA is strictly
procedural).
55. See infra notes 167-71 (discussing the strictly procedural requirements of NEPA); see
also Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558
(1978) ("NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation, but its mandate to the
agencies is essentially procedural.").
56. LAZARUS, supra note 25, at 85 (noting that NEPA's procedural requirements have had
a lasting change on agency behavior that has resulted in positive environmental effects).
57. See infra Part III.B (discussing Canadian EIA law and noting that it has a substantive
requirement); Part III.C (discussing Mexican EIA law and noting that it has a substantive
requirement).
58. See, e.g., LAZARUS, supra note 25, at 85-87 (noting that many environmentalists
thought the lack of substantive requirements of NEPA would deprive it of any meaningful long
term impact, yet also noting that NEPA's "far-reaching legacy" has been one of substantial
changes in agency behavior and positive effects on environmental protection).
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III. Domestic Environmental Impact Assessment Law
As mentioned above, both the Canadian and Mexican EIA laws are based
in large part on the United States' National Environmental Policy Act.59 As a
result, the discussion of NEPA that follows is more detailed than the later
discussion of the Canadian and Mexican laws. This Part examines the central
aspects of each law, including: the classes of projects to which the EIA
procedures apply, particularly whether they apply to private actions as well as
government actions; the scope and content of the EIA; the relationship between
federal EIA law and state or provincial EIA provisions; the degree of public
involvement throughout the EIA process; the provisions for monitoring a
project once it has been approved; the ability to gain judicial review of the EIA
process; and any existing transboundary application of the domestic laws. The
discussions of the three national EIA laws lay the groundwork for the
proposition that their methods of addressing transboundary harms are
sufficiently different as to pose an externality problem on the costs of economic
development within North America.
A. United States: The National Environmental Policy Act
NEPA was the first environmental impact assessment law and has served
as a template for many other nations.6° At NEPA's inception, some scholars
thought it was a toothless statute unlikely to have much long-term impact.
61
This analysis was correct in that NEPA (as interpreted by the courts) is
substantively toothless-NEPA does not require any minimum level of
environmental protection, nor does it require that the least environmentally
damaging alternative design be chosen.62 Rather, NEPA requires only study
and disclosure of the environmental effects of a project.63 In application,
59. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (2000).
60. LAZARUS, supra note 25, at 187 (citing MANDELKER, supra note 52, ch. 12, § 13.01).
61. See id. at 85 ("As it became apparent during the 1970s that NEPA's mandate was
essentially procedural' rather than 'substantive,' many environmentalists concluded that the
unhappy truth' was that the law lacked any meaningful long-term regulatory impact." (citing
Stryker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980); Joseph L. Sax,
The (Unhappy) Truth about NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REv. 239 (1973))).
62. Id.
63. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,
558 (1978). In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), the U.S. Supreme
Court made clear that NEPA did not impose a substantive requirement on agency action; rather,
its mandate is "essentially procedural" to "insure a fully informed and well-considered
decision." Id. at 558.
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however, NEPA has turned out to be one of the most important
environmental laws in United States history and is often thought of as the
beginning of the modem era of environmental law. 64 Indeed, NEPA has
served as the model for environmental assessment laws in at least thirty other
nations and virtually every American state.65
Although NEPA requires no substantive level of environmental
protection, the information produced by the EIA process has proven a very
effective tool in advocating for reduced environmental harms because once
the environmental consequences of an activity are disclosed, they become
"difficult to ignore. '66 As noted by one commentator, "NEPA's... far-
reaching legacy... has been its demonstration of the power of information
disclosure as an effective means of regulation. ''67 Requiring study of the
environmental effects of a project and dissemination of that information to
affected parties and environmental organizations-which might otherwise
lack the resources to discover such information-provides a powerful
lobbying tool to interested parties: "[O]nce armed with NEPA's statutory
requirement of information disclosure, environmentalists proved quite
capable of forcing the federal government to produce that information for
them and, upon its subsequent public disclosure, using the information as an
effective organizing tool.,,68 Furthermore, information disclosure has had an
environmentally positive effect on the behavior of agencies themselves.
Agencies generally act in good faith, so when presented with information
regarding a proposal's environmental effects, they typically incorporate that
information into the agency decision.69
64. LAZARUS, supra note 25, at 187.
65. Id. (citing MANDELKER, supra note 52, ch. 12, § 13.01). Nicholas Yost, former
General Counsel at the Council on Environmental Quality, suggests that NEPA "may well be
the most-imitated law in American history." Nicholas Yost, The Background and History of
NEPA, in THE NEPA LMTGATION GUIDE 1, 1 (Karin P. Sheldon & Mark Squillace eds., 1999).
66. LAZARUS, supra note 25, at 85.
67. Id.
68. Id. For additional information on the power of information disclosure, see id. at 111-
13 & 185-88.
69. Id. at 85. Professor Lazarus notes:
[Tihe information disclosure requirement turned out to change agency behavior.
Most career agency decisionmakers act in good faith. They may be initially
reluctant to expend scarce agency resources to develop information, but once the
information is before them, they are unlikely to simply ignore it. Most are instead
apt to act based on that new information.
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 849 (2006)
1. Classes of Projects Subject to EIA
The mandate for environmental impact assessment under NEPA stems
from 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C), which requires that "every recommendation or
report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment" must include a "detailed
statement" identifying:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects that cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.7°
The most important limitation to NEPA is clear from the statute: It applies only
to "legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment."71 Thus, private actions are not subject to NEPA
unless a federal agency will play a role in the action, such as by funding or
granting a permit or license. "Major Federal actions" are defined as "actions
with effects that may be major and which are potentially subject to Federal
control and responsibility. 7 2 This requires some level of federal agency control
over the action; thus, general funding without any form of federal agency
control over the use of those funds is not within the scope of NEPA.7 3
While the authority for EIA comes from NEPA, the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) was established by NEPA to determine the
procedures and regulations governing EIAs. 4 CEQ regulations provide the
specific procedures a federal agency must comply with before taking any action
that will have significant environmental effect.75 NEPA contains "action-
forcing" provisions that are intended to ensure that federal agencies act
70. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000).
71. Id.
72. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2004).
73. 40 C.F.R § 1508.18(a).
74. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 201, 42 U.S.C. § 4341.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (listing the duties and functions of the CEQ).
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according to both the letter and spirit of the law by detailing the procedures
76they must follow in order to comply with NEPA. The regulations
promulgated by the CEQ govern the details of the EIA process under NEPA to
ensure that the action-forcing provisions have their intended effect.
77
The first stage in the process is the determination whether an EIA is
actually required. Under NEPA, a full EIA occurs through the production of an
environmental impact statement (EIS).78 Environmental assessments are the
initial tool in the EIA process through which the agency determines whether to
prepare an EIS or a "finding of no significant impact" (FONSI).79
Environmental assessments can be thought of as a mini-EIS through which the
agency can determine whether a full EIS is necessary.8° According to Judge
Posner, "[a]n environmental assessment is a rough-cut, low-budget
environmental impact statement designed to show whether a full-fledged
environmental impact statement-which is very costly and time-consuming to
prepare and has been the kiss of death to many a federal project-is
necessary."
81
An EIS is generally required unless the agency determines that the action
will cause no significant impact or the action is subject to a categorical
exclusion.82 Categorical exclusions are categories of actions that the agency
has found "do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the
human environment.., and for which, therefore, neither an environmental
assessment nor an environmental impact statement is required., 83 If the agency
responsible for an action decides that an EIS is not required, it must notify the
affected public of this decision. 84 If, on the other hand, the agency decides an
76. Council on Environmental Quality Regulations, 40 C.F.R § 1500.1 (2004).
77. 40C.F.R. § 1500.1(a).
78. Although the terms environmental impact assessment (EIA) and environmental impact
statement (EIS) seem similar, EIA refers to the entire process-deciding whether an EIS is
required, producing the EIS, and completing the follow-up work required-while EIS refers to
the physical document that is created by the process.
79. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (noting that environmental assessment is partially defined as a
"concise public document... that serves to... determin[e] whether to prepare an
environmental impact statement or a finding of no significant impact .... ").
80. Id.
81. Cronin v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 919 F.2d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1990).
82. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4.
83. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4.
84. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(e)(1). For an excellent summary of the environmental impact
assessment process in the United States, see COMM'N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, SUMMARY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN TME UNITED STATES § 7.2 (2003) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES], http://www.cec.org/pubs-info-resources/
lawtreat-agree/summary envirolaw/publication/usdoc.cfm?varlan=english&topic=7.
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EIS is necessary, it must likewise notify interested persons at the beginning of
the scoping process.
8 5
2. Scope and Content of the EIS
Under NEPA, the scope of the EIS is determined by the agency under
whose jurisdiction the project is proposed (the lead agency).86 Scope under
NEPA refers to the range of actions, alternatives, and impacts to be considered
by the EIS.87 During the scoping process, the lead agency will: (1) eliminate
from the EIS insignificant issues and issues that have been covered by prior
environmental reviews; (2) reallocate assignments among agencies; and (3) deal
with other administrative issues.8 Affected federal, state, and local agencies;
Indian tribes; the proponent of the action; and other interested persons,
including environmental groups, must be invited to participate in the scoping
process.8 9
In producing the EIS, the agency must examine three types of project
alternatives: the proposed action, all reasonable alternatives, and the "no
action" alternative.9° For each of these three alternatives, direct, indirect, and
cumulative environmental impacts must be considered.91 Direct impacts are
those caused by the action being examined and which occur at the same time
and place as the action.92 Indirect impacts are caused by the action being
examined and are reasonably foreseeable but removed either in time or distance
from the action.93 Finally, cumulative impacts are those impacts "result[ing]
from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present,
and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (federal or
non-federal) or person undertakes such actions."94 The EIS should present the
alternatives as clearly defined options and should identify the agency's
preferred alternative.95
85. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7(a)(1).
86. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7(a).
87. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25.
88. 40C.F.R. § 1501.7.
89. 40 C.F.R. §1501.7(a)(1); Memorandum from the Council on Envtl. Quality on
Scoping Guidance (Apr. 30, 1981).
90. 40C.F.R. § 1502.14.
91. 40C.F.R. §§ 1502.16, 1508.7, 1508.8.
92. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(a).
93. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b).
94. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7.
95. 40C.F.R. § 1502.14.
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The EIS also must identify any mitigation measures that are appropriate to
reduce the environmental impacts of the project.96 The agency need not adopt
all mitigation measures, but it must explain why all practicable mitigation
measures were not adopted.9 7 If the project is approved, the lead agency is
responsible for ensuring that any mitigation measures that were incorporated
into the final decision are properly implemented during the course of the
project.
98
Timing is an essential element of the environmental assessment process;
the EIS must be prepared early in the planning process in order to have any
significance on the outcome. NEPA regulations require that "[a]gencies shall
integrate the NEPA process with other planning at the earliest possible time '99
and elsewhere require that the EIS "shall be prepared early enough so that it can
serve practically as an important contribution to the decisionmaking process." 100
To this end, the regulations explicitly require that the EIS cannot be used as a
post hoc rationalization for a decision that has already been made. 101
3. Relationship with State EA Procedures
NEPA influenced the creation of state environmental assessment laws,
which often parallel NEPA's model 0 2 As noted above, NEPA has been
imitated in virtually every state. 10 3 Some state laws, however, go further than
NEPA's procedural requirements by including substantive requirements-that
is ensuring that the environmental concerns are given weight in the
decisionmaking process. ° 4 Also, unlike NEPA, some state laws apply to
private action as well as governmental action. 10 5 Although comprehensive
examination of the applicability of state EIA law to transboundary harms is
beyond the scope of this Note, as a general matter little meaningful regulation
of transboundary harm exists within the United States. 106
96. 40C.F.R. § 1502.14(f).
97. 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2(c).
98. 40 C.F.R. § 1505.3.
99. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.2 (emphasis added).
100. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.5.
101. Id.




106. See Merrill, supra note 1, at 931-34 (examining the general recognition of the need
for regulation of transboundary pollution and yet the general lack of any meaningful regulation,
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4. Public Participation
Public participation has become one of the hallmarks of American
environmental law, particularly throughout the EIA process. If an agency
screens a project and decides it does not need to prepare an EIS, it must inform
the affected public of this decision. 107 If the agency decides to prepare an EIS,
then it must notify the public as soon as practicable 10 8 and invite interested
parties; the affected federal, state, and local agencies; any affected Indian tribe;
and the proponent of the action to be involved in the scoping process.' °9 The
regulations specifically provide that "interested persons" include "those who
might not be in accord with the action on environmental grounds. '"110
In addition to the opportunity to be involved in and comment on the
production of the EIS, several other requirements .ensure that public
participation in the process is meaningful. To begin with, the public must be
given access to a broad range of information, including all background
information considered during scoping, all underlying information and
comments,"' the record of decision, 12 and any mitigation monitoring results. 113
Regulations require that the EIS "be written in plain language" so that it is
readily unde~standable by decisionmakers and the public. '14 Similarly, the EIS
should be concise' 15 and should be analytical rather than encyclopedic 116 and is
required to conform to a specific format to "encourage good analysis and clear
presentation."'"17 To aid the accessibility of the EIS to the public, a summary of
the EIS must be prepared." 8  This summary must include the major
conclusions, areas of controversy, and, the issues resolved in the EIA, including
the choice among the alternatives. 119
even within the United States).
107. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(e)(1) (2004).
108. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7.
109. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7(a)(1).
110. Id.
111. 40C.F.R. § 1506.6(f).
112. 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2.
113. 40C.F.R. § 1505.3.
114. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.8.
115. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.2(c).
116. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.2(a).
117. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.10.
118. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.12.
119. Id.
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After a draft EIS has been prepared, the lead agency must submit it to the
public, 120 request comments from the public, and affirmatively solicit comments
from interested or affected parties. 121 Once a final EIS has been prepared, it too
must be submitted to the public. 122 There is then an additional thirty-day
comment period before the decision is made final, 123 and the lead agency must
respond to the comments received during this period.
124
5. Access to Judicial Review
According to one scholar: "To a degree equaled only by the civil rights
movement, lawyers and courts have been critical to the success of NEPA."'
12 5
NEPA's obligations are "essentially procedural," making the enforcement of
NEPA a relatively straightforward task for judges. 126 Although, in principal,
the courts do not examine the ultimate merits of the decision made by the
agency-as NEPA does not require a particular outcome-in early NEPA
decisions, courts closely examined agency action to ensure that the agency had
properly "taken a 'hard look' at the environmental consequences of proposals
and at less environmentally harmful alternatives."'' 27 Building from these early
cases, an enormous body of case law has evolved NEPA into one of the central
and lasting forces in American environmental law. 1
28
Importantly, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has almost uniformly
construed NEPA narrowly. 129 The result of this treatment is that while judicial
review is available for EIA issues, the courts have generally limited challenges
to cases in which the agency fails to follow the procedural requirements of
NEPA. 3 ° "NEPA, according to the Supreme Court, does not prohibit
environmentally damaging decisions or even stupid decisions," but merely
120. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.19.
121. 40C.F.R. § 1503.1(a)(4).
122. 40C.F.R. § 1502.19.
123. 40C.F.R. § 1503.1(b).
124. 40 C.F.R. § 1503.4(a).
125. Yost, supra note 65, at 6.
126. Id. at 7 (quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978)).
127. Id. (citing Clavert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U. S. Atomic Energy Comm'n,
449 F.2d 1109,1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
128. For a helpful summary of some of the cases which played a significant role in the
development of NEPA, see Yost, supra note 65, at 6-11.
129. id. at9.
130. SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 84, § 7.5.
63 WASH. & LEE L REV. 849 (2006)
decisions that fail to consider the environmental consequences of the
decision. 131 Thus, as long as the agency has followed appropriate procedures,
the courts will be very hesitant to invalidate the agency's decision.
32
6. Postapproval Monitoring
While NEPA itself does not require mitigation or monitoring of an
approved project, if the lead agency chooses to include such requirements in its
decision it has the authority to ensure compliance with those requirements.
33
Agencies can require monitoring to ensure that the project proceeds in
accordance with the requirements and conditions included in the agency
decision.'34 According to the CEQ regulations, monitoring "should" occur in
"important cases." 35 If mitigation or other conditions were established in the
EIS and included as part of the lead agency's final decision, the lead agency is
required to implement them. 136 To achieve this goal, permits or other approvals
and funding should be conditioned on mitigation when appropriate. 137 When
requested, agencies should make monitoring data available to the public.1
38
7. Transboundary Application
The application of NEPA to transboundary environmental impacts has
generated a large body of caselaw. However, a brief survey of some of the
jurisprudence on the subject indicates that NEPA's transboundary application
is limited, suggesting that domestic law may not be the appropriate avenue to
address transboundary environmental harm. In Sierra Club v. Adams, 139 one of
the earliest cases on the subject, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit was asked to address whether NEPA applied to road
131. Federico Cheever, Decision Making and Judicial Review ofAgency Decisions Under
NEPA, in THE NEPA LITIGATION GUIDE, supra note 65, at 133.
132. SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 84, § 7.5. For
a very helpful overview of judicial review under NEPA, see Cheever, supra note 131, at 132-
54.




137. 40 C.F.R. § 1505.3(a)-(b).
138. 40 C.F.R. § 1505(c).
139. Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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construction in Panama and Columbia in which the United States was
involved. 4° However, because of stipulations by the United States that it
"never questioned the applicability of NEPA to the construction of this highway
in Panama" the court "assume[d], without deciding, that NEPA is fully
applicable to construction in Panama."'14' Thus it left "resolution of this
important issue to another day.'
42
Three years later, the D.C. Circuit again had the opportunity to address the
issue and specifically ruled in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission143 that, although exports of nuclear reactors may
require an EIS for the potential environmental effects within the United
States,144 an EIS is not required for the effects occurring in the country
purchasing the reactor. 45 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission had evaluated
the environmental effects that the export would have both within the United
States and on the global commons, so the need for an EIA on effects within the
United States was not before the court.' 46 The court's decision was based
partially on strong policy arguments against imposing the United States'
congressional will on other nations. 147 The D.C. Circuit further noted that
"NEPA jurisprudence indicates that exclusively foreign impacts do not
automatically invoke the statute's environmental obligations." 48 The holding
of the case, however, was explicitly limited to cases involving the export of
nuclear reactors. 1
49
140. Id. at 389.
141. Id. at 392 n.14.
142. Id.
143. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir.
1981). At issue in Nuclear Regulatory Commission was whether and to what extent the export
of nuclear materials required consideration of the environmental effects in the recipient foreign
country. Id. at 1346. In this case the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) had evaluated the
reactor's environmental effects both within the United States and on the global commons, and
concluded they were not significant, before granting the export application. Id. at 1365. The
court determined that NEPA does not require an EIA as to the impacts falling exclusively within
foreign jurisdictions. Id. at 1347-48.
144. See id. at 1365 (finding that the NRC had made a finding of no significant impact
within the United States that the court found reasonable, thus concluding that the NRC was not
required to conduct an EIA for the decision's effects inside the United States).
145. Id. at 1366.
146. Id. at 1365.
147. Id. at 1357-58.
148. Id. at 1366.
149. See id. ("I find only that NEPA does not apply to NRC nuclear export licensing
decisions and not necessarily that the EIS requirement is inapplicable to some other kind of
major federal action abroad.").
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In 1993, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit was again faced
with the issue of NEPA's extraterritorial effect in Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Massey.150 In Massey, the Environmental Defense Fund
(EDF) challenged the decision by the National Science Foundation to
incinerate food wastes in Antarctica. 51 EDF appealed the dismissal of the
case by the district court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.152 The
district court had determined that because NEPA did not contain "a clear
expression of legislative intent through a plain statement of extraterritorial
statutory effect," it could not apply to Antarctica.1 53 The district court
based this finding on the presumption against extraterritoriality that the
U.S. Supreme Court had reaffirmed in 1991.154 The presumption against
extraterritoriality, or the extraterritoriality principle, provides that "rules of
the United States statutory law, whether prescribed by federal or state
authority, apply only to conduct occurring within, or having effect within,
the territory of the United States."'' 55 The Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that:
[T]he presumption against the extraterritorial application of
statutes .. does not apply where the conduct regulated by the statute
occurs primarily, if not exclusively, in the United States, and the
alleged extraterritorial effect of the statute will be felt in Antarctica-a
continent without a sovereign, and an area over which the United States
has a great measure of legislative control.
156
Although limited by the unusual facts of the case, the court appeared to
hold that it was the characteristics of NEPA-and not the unique
characteristics of Antarctica-that made the presumption against
150. See Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (examining




154. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 772 F. Supp. 1296, 1297 (D.D.C. 1991); see also
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,282 (1991) ("It
is a longstanding principle of American law 'that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary
intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.'"
(quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949))).
155. Massey, 986 F.2d at 530 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OFTHE UNITED STATES § 38 (1965); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFFOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF
THE UNITED STATES § 403 cmt. g (1987)).
156. Id. at 529.
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extraterritoriality inapplicable to this case. 157 The unique characteristics of
Antarctica, however, certainly strengthened the court's opinion. 
58
In 1997, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) released a memo to
"clarify the applicability of [NEPA] to proposed federal actions in the United
States, including its territories and possessions, that may have transboundary
effects extending across the border and affecting another country's
environment."1 59 The memorandum clarified the responsibilities of federal
agencies for projects occurring within the United States, but does not address
agency responsibilities for projects in which the government plays a role but
which occur outside the United States. 16° "[B]ased on legal and policy
considerations," CEQ "determined that agencies must include analysis of
reasonably foreseeable transboundary effects of proposed actions in their
analysis of proposed actions in the United States."' 161 In the context of
addressing inequitable transboundary harm within the context of NAFTA, this
is a very helpful development. It does not, however, provide protection for the
United States from environmental harms arising from projects occurring
outside the United States (unless the United States is involved in those
projects).
A recent case addressed an issue not covered by the CEQ memorandum:
Whether NEPA applies to actions occurring outside the United States, in which
the federal government plays a role. In Border Power Plant Working Group v.
Department of Energy (BPPWG), 162 the U.S. District Court for the Southern
157. See id. at 533 ("In sum, since NEPA is designed to regulate conduct occurring within
the territory of the United States, and imposes no substantive requirements which could be
interpreted to govern conduct abroad, the presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply
to this case.").
158. See id. ("Antarctica's unique status in the international arena further supports our
conclusion that this case does not implicate the presumption against extraterritoriality.").
159. Memorandum from the Council on Envtl. Quality on the Application of the National
Environmental Policy Act to Proposed Federal Actions in the United States with Transboundary




162. Border Power Plant Working Group v. Dep't of Energy, 260 F. Supp. 2d 997 (S.D.
Cal. 2003). In BPPWG, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California dealt with
what assessment NEPA required prior to granting permits to construct power transmission lines
from Mexico into the United States. Id. at 1006. In particular, the issue was whether NEPA
required assessment of the effects of the Mexican power plants that would be producing the
power, which was then imported via the transmission lines into the United States. Id. at 1012.
The court concluded that because some of the power plants, or portions thereof, operating in
Mexico were exporting 100% of the electricity produced into the United States-and indeed
were incapable of selling the power produced in Mexico-the environmental effects that the
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District of California found that before granting federal right-of-ways and
permits for electricity transmission lines from power generating facilities in
Mexico, the Department of Energy should have included an assessment of the
effects of the power plants as well as the transmission lines in the EIS.
163
However, the court required NEPA assessment only for power plants, or
portions thereof, that were located in Mexico but whose sole purpose was to
export electricity to the United States.164 The only power plants that were
required to undergo NEPA assessment were those that, given their
configuration and connection to transmission lines, were incapable of selling
the power in Mexico. 65 Thus, for those portions of the power plants that could
conceivably sell their power within Mexico, NEPA did not apply.166 Although
this case may represent a slight extension of NEPA's application to
transboundary issues, as a district court ruling its precedential effect may be
limited. Indeed, in its most recent foray, the U.S. Supreme Court did not treat
NEPA so generously.
In Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen167 the U.S. Supreme
Court considered whether NEPA required examination of the environmental
power plants caused were reasonably foreseeable significant effects of the Department of Energy
granting the permit for construction of the transmission lines. Id. at 1017. Thus, NEPA
required assessment of the effects of the power plants, or portions of power plants, which were
capable of selling electricity only to the United States, as well as requiring assessment of the
transmission lines. Id. at 1032-33.




167. Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752 (2004). In Public Citizen, the
Supreme Court considered whether the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA),
an agency of the Department of Transportation, had violated NEPA by failing to evaluate the
environmental effects of cross-border operations of Mexican-domiciled trucks. Id. at 756.
Congress had enacted a two-year moratorium on grants of operating certification to Mexican
and Canadian truckers, authorized the President to extend the moratorium beyond the two-year
period, and also authorized the President to lift the moratorium if doing so was in the national
interest. Id. at 759. The moratorium on Canadian truckers was quickly lifted, but the
moratorium on Mexican truckers was extended due to discriminatory treatment of United States
trucks in Mexico. Id. As part of NAFTA, the United States agreed to lift the moratorium by
January 2000, but this did not occur and, in February 2001, a NAFTA arbitration panel ordered
the moratorium lifted. Id. at 759-60. As a result, the President would lift the moratorium as
soon as the FMCSA enacted rules governing the grants of operating authority to Mexican
trucks. Id. at 760. In the process of its rulemaking, the FMCSA engaged in a NEPA EIA, but
did not consider the effects of the increased truck traffic from Mexico now operating in the
United States because FMCSA determined that this would be the result of the modification of
the moratorium by the President, not the new FMCSA rules. Id. at 761. The Ninth Circuit
rejected the FMCSA's reasoning and concluded that because the FMCSA's action would make
possible the operation of increased Mexican trucks in the United States, the effects of the
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impacts resulting from increased operation of Mexican trucks in the United
States. 68 The Ninth Circuit had ruled that the Department of Transportation
(DOT) had violated NEPA by failing to consider the environmental impacts
resulting from increased Mexican motor carriers operating in the United
States. 169 A unanimous U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding NEPA did not
require examination of the environmental effects of increased Mexican truck
traffic in the United States because the authority to allow increased Mexican
truck traffic was vested in the President; thus, the DOT did not have the
authority to prevent this action, but only to engage in rulemaking to give effect
to the President's decision. 170 Public Citizen is indicative of the type of narrow
interpretation the U.S. Supreme Court has given NEPA.
Although more recent cases, at least at the district and appellate court
levels, show some willingness to apply NEPA beyond America's borders,
NEPA's structure will never allow it to extend too far into transboundary
environmental harm. Even if it were given liberal interpretation, NEPA still
only applies to actions by the United States federal government or actions with
substantial federal involvement such as funding or permitting. 17 Thus, as a
method to address transboundary environmental harm, NEPA is inherently
limited, and particularly so given the narrow interpretation it has received in the
U.S. Supreme Court.
B. Canada: The Canadian Environmental Assessment Act
The Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 72 is very similar to NEPA
and, in fact, was based in large part on NEPA. Like NEPA, and to some degree
unlike Mexican EIA law, the CEAA is generally limited to actions in which the
federal government is involved; solely private actions are not subject to the
requirements of the CEAA.17 3 One major difference between NEPA and the
CEAA is that EIA law in Canada has been shaped to a much lesser degree by
increased trucks should have been included in the NEPA assessment. Id. at 762. The U.S.
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the FMSCA had no discretion to prevent the operation of
the Mexican trucks and that NEPA did not require it to examine the effects of the increased
truck operations in the United States. Id. at 770-73.
168. Id. at 756.
169. Id. at 761.
170. Id. at 756.
171. MANDELKER, supra note 52, § 1.4.
172. Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, R.S.C., ch. 37 (1992).
173. Id. § 5(1).
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litigation than it has in the United States. 174 However, the cases that have
been litigated have played a significant role in shaping the application of
the CEAA. The cases surrounding the Rafferty-Alameda Project-two
dams (the Rafferty Dam and the Alameda Dam) proposed to be built on the
Souris River Basin in southern Saskatchewan-helps to illuminate the
context in which the Federal Court of Canada1 75 has interpreted Canadian
EIA law. This litigation occurred prior to the passage of the CEAA and it
was partly in response to this litigation that the CEAA was created.
76
The series of cases surrounding the Rafferty-Alameda Project are
particularly appropriate to the topic of this Note because the Souris River
flowed from the Canadian province of Saskatchewan, where the dams were
to be constructed, into North Dakota, and then back into the Canadian
province of Manitoba before flowing on into Hudson Bay. 177 Thus, the
project had potential impacts not only in another Canadian province, but
also in the United States. In Canadian Wildlife Federation Inc. v.
Canada,178 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Court of Canada affirmed
the trial court ruling that the Minister of the Environment had failed to
order an environmental impact assessment when one was required.
179
The Rafferty-Alameda litigation thereby clarified, and limited, the
circumstances under which the Minister of the Environment had discretion
to choose not to order an environmental assessment18 by an independent
review panel. 18 1 As stated by the court in interpreting the Environmental
174. See BOYD, supra note 48, at 159 (noting that of the first 25,000 environmental
assessments completed under the CEAA, only about thirty resulted in lawsuits).
175. It should be noted that the Canadian judicial system differs in structure from the
American system. The Federal Court of Canada is a statutorily created court that reviews only
action of the Canadian Federal Government. Department of Justice, Canada, Canada's Court
System, http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/trib/page3.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2006). The
administration of justice as a general matter is left to the jurisdiction of the provinces. Id.
176. BOYD, supra note 48, at 151.
177. Canadian Wildlife Fed'n Inc. v. Canada, [1989] 3 F.C. 309, 313. It should be noted
that these cases involved an environmental assessment policy that preceded the CEAA;
however, it was this set of cases that primarily set the stage for the CEAA.
178. Canadian Wildlife Fed'n Inc. v. Canada, [1991] 1 F.C. 641 (1990).
179. Id. at 668.
180. Unlike under NEPA, where environmental assessment (EA) refers to the initial
determination of whether an EIS is required, under the CEAA, environmental assessment refers
to the overall process. In the context of the CEAA, this Note uses EA interchangeably with
environmental impact assessment (EIA).
181. Canadian Wildlife Fed'n Inc., [1991] 1 F.C. at 668 (dismissing an appeal by the
project proponent of the trial court ruling that environmental review was required under the
environmental assessment policy).
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Assessment and Review Process Guidelines Order (the precursor to the
CEAA): "[I]f an effect is not insignificant, it is by definition significant,
and only when environmental effects are insignificant or with the
application of known technology rendered insignificant can public review
be avoided."'182  Thus, in all cases of non-insignificant effects, public
review is required.
183
Another major decision three years later appeared to provide strong
legal precedent, but had substantially less practical effect. In 1992, the
Supreme Court of Canada held that the federal government had a legal
obligation to conduct an environmental assessment of the Oldman River
Dam and had failed to fulfill this obligation. 184 Although the project was
already partially completed, the court ordered an environmental
assessment. 185  This assessment recommended that the project not be
completed, but this recommendation was ignored and the project
continued. 1
86
Although both the Rafferty-Alameda and Oldman litigations occurred
prior to the implementation of the CEAA, they provide an excellent
framework for the reception environmental assessment litigation receives in
the Canadian courts.' 87 In fact, the reception is not dissimilar to that
received in the United States courts: "[Canadian courts] will 'jealously
guard the process up to the point of the final decision to ensure that all
procedural requirements have been rigorously complied with, '" 88 but
"Canadian courts are extremely reluctant to engage in substantive review of
EA decisions.,
189
182. Id. at 660. The headnote for the case went further and added the sentence: "If this
interpretation will mean mandatory public review in almost every case, that is a natural
consequence of the words chosen and highlights the importance of the public review in matters
of this kind." Id. at 643.
183. Id. One of the fascinating aspects of the decision, however, is that the court allowed
the Minister of the Environment's license to allow construction to stand, thereby allowing
construction to continue even as the court required the minister to appoint a public review panel
to conduct an EIA. Id. at 664.
184. BOYD, supra note 48, at 159 (citing Friends of the Oldman River v. Canada (Minister
of Transport), [1992] S.C.R. 3, 71).
185. Id. at 159 (citing JACK GLENN, ONCE UPON AN OLDMAN: SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS
AND THE OLDMAN RIVER DAM (1999)).
186. Id.
187. For a more complete survey of the litigation that has shaped environmental assessment
law in Canada, see BOYD, supra note 48, at 158-63.
188. Id. at 161 (citing Sandy Carpenter, Status of the B.C. Environmental Assessment
Process, in ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCE PROJECTS 144 (1999)).
189. Id. at 161.
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1. Classes of Projects Subject to EA
The CEAA requires environmental assessment of all projects in which the
federal government exercises certain powers.190 In this regard, its scope is
similar to that of NEPA.19' The types of federal actions that are sufficient to
require environmental assessment are those in which a federal authority: (a) is
the proponent of the project; (b) provides financial assistance for the project in
the form of either investment or loan guarantees; (c) sells, leases, or otherwise
disposes of interests in federal lands for the purpose of enabling the project to
be carried out; or (d) issues a permit, license, or approval for the purpose of
enabling the project to be carried out. 92 One limitation of the CEAA is that
Crown corporations (corporations owned by the federal government) are
generally exempt from the requirements of environmental assessment.
1 93
In addition to these federal authority actions for which environmental
assessment is mandatory, the Minister of the Environment has discretionary
power to order environmental assessments in other limited circumstances.
194
Similarly, the responsible authority has discretionary powers to determine when
cases not falling under the mandatory requirements for an environmental
assessment should be referred to a mediator or review panel for a full EIA.' 95
There are, however, a variety of projects that are categorically excluded from
the environmental assessment requirement (including national emergencies).
96
2. Scope and Content of the EA
Similar to NEPA, under the CEAA the responsible federal authority for
the project determines the scope of the environmental assessment to be
conducted. 197 This responsibility includes determining whether two or more
projects are so closely related that they form a single project for the purposes of
environmental assessment. 198 The environmental assessment can take the form
190. Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, R.S.C., ch. 37, § 5(1) (1992).
191. See supra Part HI.A. 1 (discussing NEPA's applicability only to actions taken by the
federal government).
192. Canadian Environmental Assessment Act § 5(1)(a)-(d).
193. BOYD, supra note 48, at 152.
194. Canadian Environmental Assessment Act § 28.
195. Id. §§ 25-27.
196. Id. § 7.
197. Id. § 15(3).
198. Id. § 15(2).
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of a screening report, a comprehensive study report, or an assessment by a
mediator or review panel. 199 However, in all circumstances, the assessment
must consider: (1) the environmental effects of the project, including
consideration of the environmental effects of a malfunction or accident and the
cumulative effects that will result from the project in conjunction with other
projects or activities that have occurred or will occur; (2) the significance of
those environmental effects; (3) comments of the public; (4) any technically
and economically feasible mitigation measures; and (5) any other relevant
matter, including the need for the project or potential alternatives to the project,
required by the Minister of the Environment. 200 In the case of a comprehensive
review, the assessment must also consider: (1) the purpose of the project;
(2) technically and economically feasible alternative means of carrying out the
project and the environmental effects of those alternatives; (3) the need for a
follow-up program to the project; and (4) the capacity of renewable resources
significantly affected by the project to meet the needs of the present and
future.2 ° ' In practice, the vast majority of environmental assessments (99.9%)
involve only screenings, and projects are virtually never stopped if subjected
only to a screening.
20
2
One of the most substantial differences between the CEAA and NEPA lies
in the statutes' respective directions to the responsible authority once an
environmental assessment has been produced. Under the CEAA, the
responsible authority can take any action necessary to permit the project to be
carried out when "the project is not likely to cause significant adverse
environmental effects" 20 3 or "the project is likely to cause significant adverse
environmental effects that can be justified in the circumstances."204 The
dramatic difference from NEPA is that under the CEAA, if the responsible
authority finds that, even taking into account any mitigation measures, "the
project is likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects that cannot
be justified in the circumstances, the responsible authority shall not exercise
any power or perform any duty... that would permit the project to be carried
out in whole or in part."205 Thus, the CEAA has a substantive requirement-
the "teeth" some commentators felt NEPA lacked-forbidding continuance of
199. Id. § 14.
200. Id. § 16(1).
201. Id. § 16(2).
202. BOYD, supra note 48, at 152-53.
203. Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, R.S.C., ch. 37, § 37(1)(a)(i) (1992).
204. Id. § 37(1)(a)(ii).
205. Id. § 37(1)(b) (emphasis added).
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the project if the environmental effects of a project cannot be justified.
However, the true impact of these teeth is questionable. 2°
3. Relationship with Provincial EIA Procedures
Like NEPA, under the CEAA a project can be subject to environmental
assessment under both federal and provincial law. 20 7 However, the federal
government of Canada can and does enter into agreements with provincial
governments pertaining to environmental assessment. 20 8  To this end, the
federal government has entered into agreements with several provinces to
ensure that environmental assessment is done in such a way as to avoid
duplication and reduce costs. 2° 9 However, some of these agreements are quite
recent, and three provinces and two territories still have not entered into
agreements with the federal government; therefore, the potential for duplicative
environmental assessments remains for projects occurring in those
jurisdictions.2 1 °
The interplay between federal and provincial EIA law was addressed by
the Rafferty-Alameda litigation. In that case, an EIA had been done according
to Saskatchewan provincial law, and the Minister of the Environment
determined that a second EIA was not required under the Environmental
Assessment and Review Process Guidelines Order (the precursor to the
CEAA).211 The Federal Court of Canada, however, found that this decision
was in error.212 The court thus required that, because the requirements and
206. See BOYD, supra note 48, at 151 (noting that during the period between 1995 and
2000, more than 99.9% of projects were approved).
207. Id. at 150.
208. Canadian Environmental Assessment Act § 54.
209. See Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, Environmental Assessment
Agreements: Federal-ProvinciadTerritorial, http://www.ceaa-acee.gc.ca/013/agreements_e
.htm#1 (last visited Dec. 5, 2005) (describing these agreements).
210. See id. (describing the agreements with the provinces). As of the writing of this Note,
the Government of Canada had entered into agreements with Alberta, British Columbia,
Manitoba, Newfoundland and Labrador, Ontario, Quebec, Saskatchewan, and the Yukon
Territory. Id. Thus there is still the potential for duplicative processes for projects occurring in
Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, the Northwest Territories, and Nunavut
Territory. However, David Boyd notes that only 80 to 100 projects a year are subject to both
federal and provincial environmental assessment. BOYD, supra note 48, at 158 (citing
CANADIAN ENvT. ASSESSMENT AGENCY, REvIEw OF THE CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT ACT: A DIscussION PAPER FOR PUBLIC CONSULTATION (2000)).
211. Canadian Wildlife Fed'n Inc. v. Canada, [1991] 1 F.C. 641,647 (1990).
212. Id. at 668.
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purposes of the provincial and federal EIA laws are sufficiently different, an
additional EIA must be done in compliance with the requirements of federal
law despite the existence of the completed provincial EIA.2 13
4. Public Participation
Although ensuring the opportunity for public participation in the
environmental assessment process is one of the stated purposes of the CEAA,214
in application the opportunities for public involvement are less than those
provided under NEPA.215 Unless the project is subject to comprehensive study,
the responsible authority will have the discretion whether to provide the public
with notice of the environmental assessment.216 As mentioned above, the vast
majority of environmental assessments are screenings.21 7 As a result, the public
participates in only ten to fifteen percent of environmental assessments in
Canada.218
If the project is subject to comprehensive study, public notice is
mandatory. 219 If a project is referred to a mediator or public review panel, any
"interested party" is eligible to participate in the mediation. 220 This opens up
mediations and public review panels to broad public participation, because
"interested party" is defined as "any person or body having an interest in the
outcome of the environmental assessment for a purpose that is neither frivolous
nor vexatious., 221 For interested parties who are involved in a mediation or
review panel, the CEAA provides funding to help facilitate public participation
at the hearings.222
213. Id.
214. Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, R.S.C., ch. 37, § 4(1)(d) (1992).
215. Cf supra Part III.A.4 (discussing the role of public participation in the EJA process
required by NEPA).
216. Canadian Environmental Assessment Act § 18(3).
217. See supra Part Ill.B.2 (noting that more than 99.9% of environmental assessments
under the CEAA are screenings (citing BOYD, supra note 48, at 152-53)).
218. BOYD, supra note 48, at 153 (citing CANADIAN ENVmL. ASSESSMENT AGENCY, REVIEW
OF THE CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT ACT: A DISCUSSION PAPER FOR PUBLIC
CONSULTATION 26 (2000)).
219. Canadian Environmental Assessment Act § 21(1).
220. Id. § 31.
221. Id. § 2(1).
222. COMM'N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN CANADA
§ 7.5 (2003) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN CANADA],
http://www.cec.org/pubs-info-resources/law-treat-agree/summary-envirolaw/.
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The final report of a mediator or review panel must be made "available to
the public in any manner the Minister considers appropriate to facilitate public
access to the report, and shall advise the public that the report is available.
' 223
In addition, the CEAA requires the responsible authority to establish a public
registry that includes documents related to each environmental assessment.224
These requirements are designed to facilitate the goal of public involvement in
the environmental assessment process.225
5. Access to Judicial Review
Judicial review in the Federal Court of Canada is generally available for
issues surrounding the environmental assessment process of the CEAA.226
Access to judicial review includes the initial decision of an agency not to
undertake an environmental assessment. 227 The CEAA specifically provides,
however, that judicial review will be denied "where the sole ground for
relief.., is a defect in form or a technical irregularity." 228 In general there has
been considerably less litigation involving environmental assessments in
Canada than in the United States. 229 As demonstrated by the Rafferty-Alameda
litigation, however, the courts are willing to step in to ensure that the EIA
process is done in accordance with the requirements of federal law.230
6. Postapproval Monitoring
If the responsible authority determines that a follow-up program is
appropriate for a project, it is required to design a follow-up program and
ensure its implementation.2 3' This is comparable to the power for monitoring
223. Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, R.S.C., ch. 37, § 36 (1992).
224. Id. § 55.
225. Id. pmbl.
226. SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [N CANADA, supra note 222, § 7.
227. Id.
228. Canadian Environmental Assessment Act § 57.
229. See BOYD, supra note 48, at 159 (noting that only thirty lawsuits arose from the first
25,000 environmental assessments conducted under the CEAA); cf. Yost, supra note 65, at 6
("To a degree equaled only by the civil rights movement, lawyers and courts have been critical
to the success of NEPA.").
230. See supra Part II.B (discussing the Rafferty-Alameda litigation).
231. Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, R.S.C., ch. 37, § 38 (1992).
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and other follow-up programs available to the lead agency under NEPA .232
Significantly, the CEAA provides that "[i]n designing a follow-up program and
in ensuring its implementation, a responsible authority is not limited by the Act
of Parliament that confers the powers it exercises or the duties or functions it
performs.' '233 This provision is of considerable importance because, in Canada,
the entity charged with a project's environmental assessment remains
responsible for the implementation of follow-up programs regardless of its area
of expertise or power.234 This gives the responsible authority wide discretion to
design and implement a follow-up program that is appropriate for the project
without being subject to the normal limitations of its power.2 35 In practice,




The CEAA and NEPA differ substantially in their application to
transboundary environmental harm. Unlike NEPA, the CEAA directly
considers how transboundary environmental effects should be addressed.
Sections 46 and 47 of the CEAA apply to transboundary and international
environmental effects of projects.237 Section 46 addresses interprovincial
effects by providing federal authority to require an environmental assessment
for projects that the Minister of the Environment believes will cause
"significant adverse environmental effects in another province. ,238
More important for the purpose of this Note is Section 47, which provides
the Minister of the Environment, in conjunction with the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, the authority to order an environmental assessment of projects that will
have "significant adverse environmental effects" outside Canada and outside
Canadian federal lands.239 If a project in Canada will have significant impacts
232. See supra Part EI.A.6 (discussing the lead agency authority to conduct follow-up and
monitoring activities of projects after NEPA assessment has concluded and the project has been
approved).
233. Canadian Environmental Assessment Act § 38(3).
234. Id. § 38(1).
235. Id. § 38.
236. BOYD, supra note 48, at 153 (citing HAZELL, supra note 48, at 157).
237. Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, R.S.C., ch. 37, §§ 46-47 (1992).
238. Id. § 46(1).
239. Id. § 47. The term "federal lands" is defined as lands owned by the Government of
Canada (except the Yukon Territory, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut); the internal waters,
territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf of Canada; and the lands reserved
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on a foreign state or subdivision thereof, the government of the foreign state or
subdivision thereof is authorized to petition the Canadian Minister of the
Environment and the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs to request an
environmental assessment.240 The Minister of the Environment and the
Minister of Foreign Affairs thus have the discretion to order an EIA for a
project solely on the basis of its transboundary environmental effects.24' This
is, however, a discretionary power, so there is no guarantee of environmental
assessment even to those projects with extensive transboundary effects.242
A substantial limitation on the practical application of Section 47 is that it
243provides only for petition by a foreign government. Thus, it provides no
mechanism for adversely affected citizens or concerned organizations of that
foreign country to request an environmental assessment. Therefore, Section 47
applies only to situations in which a foreign government (or perhaps a state or
province of a foreign government) finds that the negative environmental
consequences will be significant enough to warrant its involvement. So, for
example, individuals living in an American state who are affected by a
development and who would have the right to participate in an EIA if the
development were occurring within that state would have no guarantee that an
environmental assessment would occur if the development is occurring on the
other side of the United States-Canada border. Even if that person were able to
convince her state governor or legislature to petition the Canadian Minister of
the Environment or Minister of Foreign Affairs for an assessment, the decision
whether to require an assessment would still be within the discretion of the
Canadian ministers.244
The regulations implementing the CEAA also directly address the
environmental assessment procedures required for projects outside Canada and
outside Canadian federal lands that require a Canadian federal authority to
exercise a power or perform a function, such as licensing, permitting, or
245funding. These regulations apply in basically the same manner that the
environmental assessment process would apply to projects undertaken within
for the benefit of a band subject to the Indian Act and all waters on and airspace above those
lands. Id. § 2.
240. Id. § 47(3)(b).
241. Id. §§ 46-47.
242. Id.
243. Id. § 47(3)(b).
244. Id. § 47(3).
245. Projects Outside Canada Environmental Assessment Regulations C.R.C. SOR/96-491
(1996) (Can.).
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Canada. z4 6 In the context of transboundary harms, these regulations apply in
basically the same manner as the domestic provisions and give discretionary
power to the Minister of the Environment to refer the project to a mediator or
review panel for an environmental assessment.247 In making such an order, the
Minister must consult with the responsible authority and the Minister of
Foreign Affairs.248
Although the codification of the application of EIA law to transboundary
harms may be better than no such provision, this has not played out in practice.
In fact, the CEAA has never been used to assess the potential transboundary
harms of a project. 249 Thus the significance of the CEAA's transboundary
provisions remains uncertain, but it appears to be considerably limited in
practice.
C. Mexico: Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations
The authority for environmental impact assessments in Mexico is under
The General Environmental Act of Ecological Balance and Environmental
Protection of 1988 (Ecology Law), 250 which was significantly revised in
1996.251 Unlike American environmental law, which has separate laws for
various types of environmental media,252 Mexican environmental law is
implemented under one comprehensive environmental statute. 53 The Ecology
Law covers all aspects of environmental quality except water, forests, and
fisheries.254 The EIA mechanism within the Ecology Law is implemented by
246. The most substantial difference is that the Comprehensive Study List does not apply.
Id. § 3(2).
247. Id. § 28.
248. Id.
249. BOYD, supra note 48, at 154 (citing Steven Kennett, The Canadian Environmental
Assessment Act's Transboundary Provisions: Trojan Horse or Paper Tiger?, 5 J. ENVTL. L. &
PRAc. 263 (1995)).
250. Ley General del Equilibrio Ecol6gico y la Protecci6n al Ambiente [L.G.E.E.]
[Environmental Protection Law], Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 28 de Enero de 1988
(Mex.) [hereinafter Ecology Law]. For translations and analysis of Mexican environmental law,
this Note relied primarily on JORGE A. VARGAS, MEXICAN LAW: A TREATISE FOR LEGAL
PRACTITIONERS AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTORS (1998); STEPHEN ZAMORA ET AL., MEXICAN LAW
(2004).
251. VARGAS, supra note 250, at 435; Paulette S. Wolfson, Mexican Environmental Law
and Regulations, 36 Hous. LAW. 10, 10 (1999).
252. For example, the Clean Air Act regulates air quality, the Clean Water Act regulates
water quality, etc.
253. VARGAS, supra note 250, at 435.
254. Wolfson, supra note 251, at 11.
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regulations promulgated by the Secretariat of the Environment, Natural
Resources and Fisheries (Secretaria del Medio Ambiente, Recursos Naturales y
Pesca, or SEMARNAP).2 ss The National Institute of Ecology (Instituto
Nacional de Ecologfa), one of SEMARNAP's two environmental agencies,
implements the EIA process.256
Throughout recent history, Mexican environmental laws have been
plagued with problems of enforcement.257 Although not specifically addressed
in this Note, concerns regarding the enforceability of Mexican EIA law are
significant.258 Indeed, the lack of enforcement in Mexican environmental law is
another factor in support of a transboundary mechanism by which other nations,
principally the United States, can ensure that failure to enforce Mexican law
does not result in environmental harms within the United States.
1. Classes of Projects Subject to EM
Unlike NEPA, which applies only to actions taken by the federal
government, Mexican EIA law applies to actions by any party-federal, state,
or private-so long as it is a type of project which is deemed to require an
EIA.259 According to a 1992 report by the United States General Accounting
Office, "Mexico's General Ecology Law of 1988 requires that the
Secretariat ... give advance authorization for public or private actions that
could cause adverse ecological effects or violate federal environmental
regulations and standards.
26 0
255. Id. at 10. The Secretaria del Medio Ambiente, Recursos Naturales y Pesca is
abbreviated by some as SEMARNAP, VARGAS, supra note 250, at 434, and by others as
SEMARNAT, ZAMORA Er AL., supra note 250, at 400.
256. Wolfson, supra note 251, at 11; VARGAS, supra note 250, at 436.
257. See VARGAS, supra note 250, at 435 (discussing the enforcement problems that have
affected Mexican environmental law from the 1940s through the 1980s); ZAMORA ErAL, supra
note 250, at 399 (noting that even after adopting the Ecology Law, "Mexico was slow to enforce
its environmental laws with vigor"); Sanchez, supra note 7, at 96 ("A key problem for Mexico is
environmental enforcement.").
258. See ZAMORA Er AL., supra note 250, at 406 (noting that while enforcement of Mexican
environmental law is improving, it is hampered by a lack of resources and an inability of
concerned citizens to bring citizen suits when government enforcement is lacking).
259. VARGAS, supra note 250, at 456-57.
260. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION, U.S. SENATE, U.S.-MExICO TRADE: ASSESSMENT OF MEXICO'S
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS FOR NEw COMPANIES, GAO/GGD-92-113, at 10 (1992) [hereinafter
GAO REPORT] (emphasis added).
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Under the Ecology Law, there are thirteen specific types of projects that
must be approved by SEMARNAP prior to beginning the project.261 The first
twelve categories are specific types of projects, while the thirteenth is the catch-
all section that covers "works or activities under federal jurisdiction that could
cause serious and irreparable ecological imbalance, harm to public health or to
ecosystems, or exceed the limits and conditions established in the [Ecology
Law]. '262 The combination of application to both government and private
actions and the breadth of these thirteen categories gives Mexican EIA law an
extremely wide scope, in theory giving EIA law in Mexico a wider application
263than NEPA. At the time of the 1992 GAO report, however, ElAs in Mexico
were not strictly or widely enforced, and a sample of American companies
starting operations in Mexico showed that none of the six companies sampled
had prepared an ELA.264
2. Scope and Content of the EIA
The first step in the authorization process will generally be the submission
of an Environmental Impact Statement (Manifestaci6n de Impacto Ambiental)
(EIS) or a Preventative Report (Informe Preventivo) to SEMARNAP.265 A
Preventative Report is filed instead of an EIS if facility operations are not
261. VARGAS, supra note 250, at 456.
262. Id. The full list of projects to which SEMARNAP authorization is required is:
(1) hydraulic works, general means of communication, oil and gas pipelines, coal
ducts and polyducts; (2) oil, petrochemical, chemical, iron and steel, paper, sugar,
cement and electrical industries; (3) exploration, exploitation and processing of
minerals and substances reserved to the federal government pursuant to the Mining
Acts and Article 27 of the Constitution; (4) installations for treatment, confinement
or elimination of hazardous and radioactive waste; (5) forestry use in tropical
forests and in species difficult to regenerate; (6) forest plantations; (7) changes of
soil use in forest areas and in tropical forest and arid zones; (8) industrial parks
when highly hazardous activity is planned; (9) real estate developments that affect
coastal ecosystems; (10) works and activities in wetlands, mangrove swamps,
lagoons, rivers, lakes and estuaries connected to the sea and their shores;
(11) works in protected natural areas under federal jurisdiction; (12) fishing,
aquaculture or fish farming that could endanger the preservation of one or more
species of fish or harm the ecosystem; and (13) works or activities under federal
jurisdiction that could cause serious and irreparable ecological imbalance, harm to
public health or to ecosystems, or exceed the limits and conditions established in
the [Ecology Law].
Id.
263. Wolfson, supra note 251, at 13.
264. GAO REPORT, supra note 260, at 13.
265. Wolfson, supra note 251, at 13.
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anticipated to harm the environment.266  SEMARNAP will review the
Preventative Report and determine within twenty days whether the Preventative
Report is sufficient or whether a full EIS is required.267 Preventative Reports
are published in the Ecological Gazette and made available to the public.268
If SEMARNAP determines that an EIS is required, the proponent must
submit one of two types of EIS. Regional EISs are filed for more wide-scale
developments such as industrial parks, large aquaculture farms, highways and
railways, nuclear generators, dams, and projects in areas determined to be of
ecological significance or sensitivity. 269 For all other cases, a particular EIS
must be submitted. 270  A particular EIS must include the specifics of the
project, the project's relation to applicable environmental provisions and land
use regulations, a description of the environment of the project area including
any environmental problems already present in the area, the environmental
effects of the project, and any prevention or mitigation procedures that will be
included in the project.27'
If a project is considered "high risk," Mexican law requires the EIS to
include another document-a risk study-for the project. High risk operations
are those involving flammable, explosive, toxic, reactive, radioactive, or
272corrosive, generally hazardous substances that exceed a reportable quantity.
"The risk study must address the possible risks to the environment that the
operations pose and must detail the safety measures that will be taken in the
event of an accident to avoid, mitigate, or minimize environmental harm. ,
273
SEMARNAP will evaluate the EIS and will either disallow the operation,
approve the operation, or grant approval conditional on project modifications
required to reduce adverse environmental effects.274 In evaluating an EIS,
266. Id.
267. Id.; see also COMM'N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
IN MEXICO § 7.3 (2003) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN MEXICO],
http://www.cec.org/pubs-info-resources/law-treat-agree/summary-enviro-law/public
cation/mxdoc.cfm?varlan=english&topic=7.
268. Wolfson, supra note 251, at 13.
269. Id. The complete list of conditions which require a regional EIS are specified in
article I I of the EIS Regulations and include: industrial and aquacultural parks, aquaculture
farms over 500 hectares, highways and railways, nuclear energy projects, dams, projects that
alter hydrological basins, works or undertakings included in a partial urban development or
zoning plan, and works to be carried out in a determined ecological region. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Wolfson, supra note 251, at 13.
273. Id.
274. Id.; SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN MEXICO, supra note 267, § 7.2.
TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT 889
SEMARNAP must take into account the effect of the project on the whole
ecosystem, not only those resources that are exploited or affected. 5 This
includes considering the use of natural resources and the functional integrity of
the ecosystem and the ecosystem's load capacity for those resources. 276 The
evaluation of EISs should occur within sixty days of SEMARNAP receiving
the EIS .277
If approval is granted by SEMARNAP, it is valid for one year, during
which time the project must complete construction and comply with any
additional conditions required by the approval.278 SEMARNAP may also
require the proponent to file appropriate environmental and safety monitoring
documentation.2 79  Inspection and prosecution of violations of the
environmental conditions imposed on a project are conducted by the Federal
Attorney General for Environmental Protection (Procuradurfa Federal de
Protecci6n al Ambiente) (PROFEPA).28 °
3. Relationship with State EIA
Although Mexican environmental law generally has concurrent
jurisdiction between federal and state governments, 281 Mexican EIA procedures
provide that, although states can also implement their own environmental
282impact assessment procedures, any activity that has an environmental impact
on two or more states remains subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction.283 Also
subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction are environmental assessments of
industries under federal jurisdiction, which are numerous in Mexico.2 4 The
Ecology Law generally provides that when the federal government has
jurisdiction over the EIA process, that jurisdiction is exclusive.285
275. Id.
276. Id. § 7.3.
277. Id.
278. Wolfson, supra note 251, at 13.
279. SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN MEXICO, supra note 267, at § 7.4.
280. Id.
281. ZAMORA Et AL., supra note 250, at 399.
282. In fact, one of the major purposes of the 1996 Amendments was a shift in regulatory
focus from the federal government to state government. Wolfson, supra note 251, at 10.
283. Ecology Law, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 28 de Enero de 1988 (Mex.),
art. 5, § XX; ZAMORA ET AL., supra note 250, at 401; Wolfson, supra note 251, at 10.
284. G. Gonzales & M. Gastelum, Overview of the Environmental Laws of Mexico, 9
CURRENTS: INT'LTRADE L.J. 49, 51 (2000).
285. VARGAS, supra note 250, at 445-46.
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When jurisdiction for the EIA process is not reserved to the federal
government, it becomes the responsibility of the states.286 Indeed the Ecology
Law requires that the states evaluate the environmental impacts of proposed
projects when they fall within state rather than federal jurisdiction.287 In
general, the state laws are identical to their federal counterparts.
288
4. Public Participation
Public involvement is an area in which the Mexican EIA law falls
considerably short of its American and Canadian counterparts. Although the
Ecology Law made substantial strides in making information available to the
public and in encouraging public input into the planning and oversight of
environmental policy, 28 9 the provisions for public involvement in the EIA
process are considerably weaker. In contrast to the American and Canadian
EIA processes, under Mexican law, public involvement occurs only after the
EIS has been prepared, rather than throughout the entire EIA process.29°
Once an EIS is approved by SEMARNAP, it is listed along with other
approved EISs, and that list is published in the Ecological Gazette.29' One
copy of the EIS is made available for review, and if requested, the document
can be made available to the public.292 SEMARNAP has the discretion to
organize a public information meeting.293 The public may then comment on
the EIS, and SEMARNAP must address the comments in making its final
decision.294
286. Id. For a complete list of the types of activities subject to the SEMARNAP EIA
process, see id. at 437; for a list of projects which are exempt from the SEMARNAP EIA
process, see id. at 437-38.
287. Id. at 459.
288. Id.
289. See id. at 455-56 (discussing the increase in public participation in environmental law
and policy and the public access to information provided by the Ecology Law).
290. Heather N. Stevenson, Comment, Environmental Impact Assessment Law in the
Nineties: Can the United States and Mexico Learn from Each Other?, 32 U. RicH. L. REv.
1675, 1697-98 (1999) (citing Greg Block, One Step Away from Environmental Citizen Suits in
Mexico, in MAKING FREE TRADE WORK IN THE AMERICAS, 626, 632 (Boris Kozolchyk ed.,
1993)).
291. Id. at 1697.
292. Id.; VARGAS, supra note 250, at 459.
293. Stevenson, supra note 290, at 1697.
294. Id.
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5. Access to Judicial Review
In access to judicial review, Mexican EIA law lags considerably behind its
United States and Canadian counterparts. 95 It should be noted, however, that
much of this has to do with the civil law system in Mexico in which many of
the aspects of judicial review and citizen access to the courts that we consider
basic in a common law system are inapplicable.296 If members of the public
object to an agency decision, they have a few options, although none is very
likely to succeed. First, anyone who objects to an agency decision may make a
public denunciation of the agency's actions, which "can lead to an
investigation.., by the Office of the Federal Attorney General for
Environmental Protection. " 297 The recommendations of the Office of the
Federal Attorney General for Environmental Protection, though autonomous
298and public, are nonbinding. A second option is to challenge the decision
directly in court under provisions similar to American citizen suits; however,
standing for review of environmental matters has rarely been established. 299
The third option is to make a submission to the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation (CEC) under NAFTA.300 However, while a submission to the
Commission can publicize the issue, the CEC will not make any
recommendations on the issue.3 °1 Submissions to the CEC can, and have, been
made against Canada or the United States; however, they may be of particular
value in Mexico given the greater difficulty in gaining judicial review in the
domestic legal system. Thus, although there are avenues to bring the issue
greater attention, the odds of succeeding in a challenge to a SEMARNAP
decision are slim.
295. Cf supra Part IHI.A.5 (discussing the access to judicial review of EIAs under NEPA);
supra Part IlH.B.5 (discussing the access to judicial review of environmental assessments under
the CEAA).
296. See Mark A. Drumbl, Amalgam in the Americas: A Law School Curriculum for Free
Markets and Open Borders, 35 SAN DmoO L. REv. 1053, 1074-77 (1998) (discussing the
differences between the common law system of the United States and Canada and the civil law
system of Mexico, and the confusion these differences have caused, specifically in the
environmental field).
297. Stevenson, supra note 290, at 1698 (citing Ecology Law, Diario Oficial de la
Federaci6n [D.O.], 28 de Enero de 1988 (Mex.), tit. VI, ch. VII, arts. 189, 192-95).
298. Id. (citing Ecology Law, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 28 de Enero de 1988
(Mex.), tit. VI, ch. VII, art. 195).
299. Id. (citing Anne Rowley, Mexico's Legal System of Environmental Protection, 24
ENvTL. L. REP. 10,431, 10,435 (1994)); ZAMORA ET AL., supra note 250, at 404.
300. See infra Part V (discussing the submissions procedure of the CEC).
301. Infra Part V (citing NAAEC, supra note 26, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1480, 1488).
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6. Postapproval Monitoring
After the EIS is complete and SEMARNAP issues a permit or
authorization for a project to proceed, there are several potential monitoring
mechanisms to ensure compliance. First, SEMARNAP can require the project
to file reports documenting the compliance with the requirements of the EIS.3 °2
The Federal Attorney General for Environmental Protection also has authority
to perform inspections of a project and, if needed, impose sanctions to ensure
compliance with the EIS requirements.30 3 SEMARNAP also has the authority
to inspect projects to ensure compliance. 304 Finally, citizen complaints can be
used to notify PROFEPA of a violation of the EIS requirements.3 °5
SEMARNAP' s legal authority for monitoring is similar to that provided to
SEMARNAP's equivalents by United States and Canadian law.30 6 However, as
discussed above, one of the biggest problems with Mexican environmental law
is a historical lack of enforcement. Like enforcement generally, provisions for
postapproval monitoring will only be effective to the degree that they are
properly carried out by SEMARNAP.
7. Transboundary Application
Although nothing in the Ecology Law limits the scope of the EIA process
to domestic environmental harm, there is also nothing which suggests that the
EIA process should have a scope beyond domestic environmental harm.3 °7
None of the research for this Note provided any indication that Mexican EIA
law has been extended beyond domestic harms. Given the problems with
enforcement of Mexican environmental law generally-and particularly the
lack of repercussions for failure to perform an EIA, as discussed above-it
seems highly unlikely that, in practice, Mexican EIA law will address harms
beyond Mexican borders until major improvements are made in the overall
enforcement and effectiveness of Mexican environmental law.
30 8




306. Cf. supra Part Il.A.6 (discussing the authority for postapproval monitoring provided
by NEPA); supra Part III.B.6 (discussing the authority for postapproval monitoring provided by
the CEAA).
307. See VARGAS, supra note 250, at 456-59,464,465 (discussing Mexican EIA law with
no mention of the application to transboundary harms).
308. For an analysis of a Mexican dam project begun after the implementation of the
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IV. Potential Implementing Law for a TEIA Mechanism
Although the three domestic EIA laws do not provide a suitable method
for assessment of transboundary harms, a multilateral agreement can fill this
gap. There are several potential candidate laws for implementing a TEIA
mechanism. Although there are certainly others, the ones which seem most
plausible are examined briefly here. The first two candidate laws are
international laws on transboundary EIA to which the signatories to NAFTA
could join.309 However, because of limitations in the agreements and their
generic nature, they are not optimally suited to be the implementing measure
for TEIA under NAFTA. The next two, the La Paz Agreement and the
Boundary Waters Treaty, are bilateral agreements on specific issues of
environmental concern.3 1° In theory, these agreements could be broadened to
cover a transboundary EIA and be signed by the third NAFTA member. The
likelihood of this, however, is slim, and because neither of these agreements
was designed for EIA, they would have to be substantially modified from their
original purpose. The final candidate law is the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) and its implementing body, the
Commission on Environmental Cooperation (CEC). 3 1 1 For reasons discussed
below, adopting the NAAEC seems the appropriate legal mechanism to
implement TEIA in North America.
A. Substantive International Law: The International Law Commission's
Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm
In 2001, the International Law Commission (ILC) adopted Draft Articles
on Prevention of Transboundary Harm From Hazardous Activities (Draft
Articles on Transboundary Harm).3 12 The development of the Draft Articles on
Ecology Law with harms occurring both within Mexico and the United States, but without
effective environmental assessment of the harms occurring on either side of the border, see
generally Raul M. Sanchez, Mexico's El Cuchillo Dam Project: A Case Study of
Nonsustainable Development and Transboundary Environmental Harms, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-
AM. L. REv. 425 (1997).
309. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the International Law Commission's draft articles on
the prevention of transboundary harm); Part IV.B (discussing the Espoo Treaty on
transboundary harm).
310. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the La Paz Agreement and the Boundary Waters
Treaty).
311. See infra Parts IV.D & V (discussing the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation and the Commission on Environmental Cooperation).
312. Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, in
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Transboundary Harm represents a significant step forward at the international
level in the recognition of the legal obligation of nations to avoid causing
environmental harm within another nation. If incorporated into a convention
and ratified by nations, it would indeed be major progress in the legal
framework designed to prevent transboundary harm. No such convention has
been negotiated, let alone approved, however, and the ILC proposal's
generalized language provides little assurance that it would be effectively
implemented and enforced in practice. Furthermore, because the Draft Articles
on Transboundary Harm operate as background or default law for cases in
which no other law applies and can be supplanted by other law, the Draft
Articles on Transboundary Harm are entirely consistent with the solution
proposed by this Note.
The ILC is a body established by the United Nations General Assembly in
1947 to develop and codify international law. 313 The ILC's work generally
involves preparing draft articles on topics of international law.314 Once
completed, draft articles are submitted to the General Assembly.315 Normally
the draft articles are then incorporated into a convention, which is then open to
ratification by states. 3 16  The ILC attempts to codify existing topics of
international law, so its efforts are somewhat analogous to the Restatements
produced by the American Law Institute.
The Draft Articles on Transboundary Harm build on the principle, adopted
in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,317 of a nation's
sovereign right to develop its resources so long as it does not cause harm to
another nation. Thus the Draft Articles on Transboundary Harm recognize the
"permanent sovereignty of States over the natural resources within their
territory," but note that "the freedom of States to carry on or permit activities in
their territory... is not unlimited.'31  At base, the Draft Articles on
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N.
GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles].
313. International Law Commission, Introduction, http://www.un.orgllawilc/ (last visited
Jan. 14, 2006); see also U.N. Charter art. 13 (providing the authority for the ILC's work).




317. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-14, 1992, Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc A/CoNF. 151/5/Rev. 1, reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 874 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration], available at http://www.unep.org/Documents/
Default.asp?DocumentlD=78&ArticlelD= 163.
318. Draft Articles, supra note 312, pmbl. See also Rio Declaration, supra note 317, princ.
2, stating:
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Transboundary Harm require a nation whose actions will potentially harm
another to assess the risk of transboundary harm,319 take all appropriate
measures to prevent or minimize the risk of significant transboundary harm,
320
notify and consult and cooperate with the potentially harmed nation, 32 1 and
balance the benefits of the action against its potential harm in determining
whether to proceed.322 Thus, the Draft Articles on Transboundary Harm appear
to intend for the resolution of potential transboundary harms by negotiation
between the acting nation and the potentially harmed nation to determine a
course of action that is acceptable to both.323
In 2001, the ILC also completed Draft Articles on Responsibility of States
for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Draft Articles on Responsibility of
States).324 The Draft Articles on Responsibility of States apply to all types of
international law, including international environmental law.325 These articles
do not impose rules of conduct; rather they determine the rights, obligations,
and remedies that arise when a nation has breached an international
obligation.326 In simplest terms, the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States
state that when a breach of an international obligation occurs, the breach creates
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles
of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to
their own environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Id.
319. Draft Articles, supra note 312, art. 7.
320. Id. art. 3.
321. Id. arts. 4, 8, 9.
322. Id. arts. 9-10.
323. See id. (discussing the consultations that should occur between nations and the factors
which should be balanced in determining an appropriate course of action to minimize harm).
324. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report
of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th
Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), available at http://www.un.org/
law/ilc/texts/instruments/englishldraft%20articles9_6_2001.pdf.
325. See generally Mark A. Drumbl, Trail Smelter and the International Law
Commission's Work on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts and State
Liability, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEsSONS FROM THE TRAIL
SMELTER ARBITRATION (Miller & Bratspies eds., 2005) (discussing the influence the Trail
Smelter arbitration on environmental harm from Canada that affected Washington state had on
the development of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts).
326. Robert Rosenstock & Margo Kaplan, Current Development: The Fifty-Third Session
of the International Law Commission, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 412, 412-13 (2002).
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new obligations for the breaching state and new rights for the injured state.1
2 1
The breaching state is now under the obligation to cease the breaching activity,
to ensure that the breach does not reoccur, and to make full reparation for the
harm. 32 8 The injured state now has the right to demand that the breaching state
take responsibility for the harm and a limited right to take countermeasures to
enforce compliance on the part of the breaching state. 329 If adopted by
convention, the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States and the Draft Articles
on Prevention of Transboundary Harm combine to form both a duty not to
cause significant transboundary harm and a method of enforcement for
breaches of that duty.
An interesting feature of the Draft Articles on Transboundary Harm is
their provision for resolution of disputes when cooperation, negotiation, or like
means have failed. In such a case, the Draft Articles on Transboundary Harm
provide that an "impartial fact-finding commission" shall be established to
produce a report on the dispute. 330 The nations involved in the dispute then
"shall consider [the report] in good faith. 3 3 1 What is interesting about this
process in the North American context is its similarity to the role already played
by the citizen submission process of the CEC discussed in Part IV.D.332
One limitation of the Draft Articles on Transboundary Harm is their lack
of specificity. For example, article 7 is the sole article dealing specifically with
the assessment of the risk. It provides: "Any decision in respect of the
authorization of an activity within the scope of the present articles shall, in
particular, be based on an assessment of the possible transboundary harm
caused by that activity, including any environmental impact assessment.,
333
This does not address several important issues. First, it appears only to suggest,
not mandate, that an EIA be conducted; that is, there is no requirement that an
EIA occur, only that if an EIA is conducted it should be used for the assessment
of transboundary harm.334 This is also reflected in the commentaries to the
Draft Articles on Transboundary Harm that state "a State of origin.., should
327. Daniel Bodansky & John R. Crook, The ILC's State Responsibility Articles, 96 AM. J.
INT'LL. 773, 785 (2002).
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Draft Articles, supra note 312, art. 19.
331. Id.
332. See infra Part IV.D (discussing the role the CEC citizen submission process and the
development of a Factual Record play in the enforcement of environmental law in North
America).
333. Draft Articles, supra note 312, art. 7.
334. Id.
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ensure that an assessment is undertaken of the risk of the activity causing
significant transboundary harm. ' 35  Further, the Draft Articles on
Transboundary Harm leave many important aspects of the EIA to be
determined by domestic law, principally who should conduct the EIA and what
the content of the EIA should be.336
The Draft Articles on Transboundary Harm are also vague on public
participation. However, if implemented effectively they provide the potential
for significant public involvement. Article 13 provides that "States concerned
shall, by such means as are appropriate, provide the public likely to be affected
by an activity.., with relevant information relating to that activity, the risk
involved and the harm which might result and ascertain their views."337 These
minimal protections of public participation are somewhat augmented by article
15, which provides that a state must provide access to its judicial system for
individuals affected by transboundary harm, without regard to their nationality
338or residence or where the harm may occur. These provisions leave a great
deal of discretion to the states. A degree of discretion is certainly needed to
ensure that the process is appropriately adaptable to local circumstances, but the
lack of specificity also has the potential to leave the Draft Articles on
Transboundary Harm with limited practical effect.
A final concern with the Draft Articles on Transboundary Harm is that
they appear to impose a substantive requirement that may make some states
uncomfortable. The Draft Articles on Transboundary Harm start with the basic
premise that states are under an obligation to prevent significant transboundary
harm.3 39 This is coupled with a balancing of harms and benefits that appears to
stand for the proposition that harms should not outweigh benefits. 34 While in
accord with the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, some states may find
such balancing an imposition on their sovereignty.
Though there are certainly issues of concern involving the Draft Articles on
Transboundary Harm-principal among these, of course, is if or when they will
be incorporated into a convention and adopted by the states-their development
335. Commentaries to the Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from
Hazardous Activities, at 402, in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its
Fifty-Third Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001)
(emphasis added), available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc.
336. Id. at 404; Draft Articles, supra note 312, art. 7.
337. Draft Articles, supra note 312, art. 13 (emphasis added).
338. Id.
339. See id. art. 3 ("The State of origin shall take all appropriate measure to prevent
significant transboundary harm or at any event to minimize the risk thereof.").
340. See id. art. 10 (discussing the factors which should be balanced to ensure that an
equitable result is reached between the state of origin and the state likely to be affected).
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is a significant step in the prevention of transboundary harm. Due to their
generality, even if adopted, the Draft Articles on Transboundary Harm leave a
great deal of discretion in their implementation to member states.
341
Furthermore, the Draft Articles on Transboundary Harm act as background law
and are without prejudice to other obligations mandated by other relevant
treaties or rules of customary international law. 342 Therefore, the solution to
transboundary EIA in North America proposed in this Note is entirely
consistent with, and supports the goals of, the Draft Articles on Transboundary
Harm.
B. International Agreements: The Espoo Treaty
The Espoo Treaty, or more formally the Convention on Environmental
Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context of the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe, was signed in Espoo, Finland in 1991.
3
Its purpose was to address the issue of transboundary environmental impacts by
providing a uniform TEIA process. 344 Unfortunately, the Espoo Treaty is
subject to a number of limitations. The most important limitation within the
context of North America is that only Canada and the United States have
signed the Treaty, while Mexico has not.345 In addition, only Canada has
ratified the Convention, while the United States has not.34 6  Because the
provisions of the treaty apply only if both the nation in which development is
taking place and the affected nation have ratified the treaty, the treaty's
provisions apply to no North American nation with reference to each other
341. See id. art. 5 ("States concerned shall take the necessary legislative, administrative or
other action including the establishment of suitable monitoring mechanisms to implement the
provisions of the present articles.").
342. Id. art. 18.
343. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Feb.
25, 1991, 1989 U.N.T.S. 309, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 800 [hereinafter Espoo Treaty], available
at http://www.unece.orglenv/eia/documents/conventiontextenglish.pdf.
344. Id. pmbl, art. 2.
345. United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Convention on Environmental
Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Participants, http://www.unece.org/env/
eia/convratif.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2006) [hereinafter Espoo Participants]. Canada signed
the Espoo Convention on February 26, 1991 and ratified the Convention on May 13, 1998. Id.
The United States also signed the Convention on February 26, 1991 but has not ratified the
Convention. Id. Canada also included a reservation that excluded the Convention's effect from
activities that fall outside federal legislative jurisdiction under the Canadian constitutional
system. Id.
346. Id.
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(although Canada would be bound if development affected another nation that
had ratified the treaty). 47
Another shortcoming of the Espoo Treaty is that it does not allow
nongovernmental entities to start the EIA process.348 The Espoo Treaty defines
"affected party" solely as the signatories to the Convention. 349 This limits the
ability of organizations with otherwise valid transboundary affected status but
without government support to request an EIA. Article 2(6), however, provides
some support for affected organizations' and individuals' rights to at least
participate in the EIA process by requiring that the public in affected areas have
the same right to participate in the EIA process as the public in the country in
which the activity is proposed.350 This should require the country in which the
activity is proposed to allow the public of the affected country full access to the
EIA process. However, if the affected country's government chooses not to
become involved in the issue, it will not become an "affected party."
35
'
Because the rights of the public provided in the treaty apply only to an "affected
party," the public of a country who has not become involved in the issue will
not have those legal rights.352 These concerns were somewhat alleviated with a
new set of amendments adopted in 2004; however, these amendments have not
yet been ratified by any nation.353
347. See Espoo Treaty, supra note 343, arts. l(i)-(ii) (defining "parties," "party of origin,"
and "affected party" as contracting parties to the treaty).
348. See supra Part II.B.7 (noting that this shortcoming is also present in the international
provisions of the CEAA).
349. Espoo Treaty, supra note 343, art. l(i).
350. The Espoo Treaty provides:
The Party of origin shall provide, in accordance with the provisions of this
Convention, an opportunity to the public in the areas likely to be affected to
participate in relevant environmental impact assessment procedures regarding
proposed activities and shall ensure that the opportunity provided to the public of
the affected Party is equivalent to that provided to the public of the Party of origin.
Id. art. 2(6); see also id. art. 3(8) (requiring that both the affected party and the party of origin-
the country in which the activity is proposed-are responsible for ensuring that the public
within the affected party are able to participate in the process).
351. See id. art. 3(4) (noting that if the affected party chooses not to participate in the EIA
process, then it is up to the domestic law of the party of origin to determine whether an EIA is
required and under these circumstances many of the rights of the affected party under the treaty
will not apply).
352. Id.
353. See United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Second Amendment to the
Espoo Convention, http://www.unece.org/env/eia/amendment2.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2006);
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Status of Ratification, http://www.
unece.org/env/eia/ratification.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2006).
63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 849 (2006)
C. Bilateral Agreements
In addition to international law, there are two bilateral agreements already
existing within North America to deal with environmental issues that could be
extended to include provisions for TEIA. The most appropriate bilateral
agreements to be extended to include TEIA procedures are the Agreement on
Co-operation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the
Border Area (La Paz Agreement) 54 between the United States and Mexico and
the International Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 (Boundary Waters Treaty)
355
between the United States and Canada. As discussed below, however, neither
of these agreements is an ideal method to implement TEIA, principally because
they are bilateral-rather than trilateral-agreements and the primary purpose
of each agreement is not particularly relevant to the third member of NAFTA.
1. The Agreement on Co-operation for the Protection and Improvement
of the Environment in the Border Area
The La Paz Agreement deals with specific environmental issues on the
United States-Mexico border. A similar role is played by the International Joint
Commission (discussed below) in dealing with certain environmental concerns
along the United States-Canada border.356 Although no EIA methodology has
been implemented under the La Paz Agreement, the Agreement provides
support for the creation of a TEIA procedure to deal with environmental
concerns occurring near the United States-Mexico border.357 However, the La
Paz Agreement is subject to criticism that it is too general a framework and thus
does not have the structure needed to solve environmental problems present in
354. Agreement on Co-operation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment
in the Border Area, U.S.-Mex., Aug. 14, 1983, T.I.A.S. No. 10,827, 22 I.L.M. 10,255
[hereinafter La Paz Agreement].
355. Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters,
And Questions Arising Between the United States and Canada, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Jan. 11, 1909,36
Stat. 2448 [hereinafter Boundary Waters Treaty], available at http://www.ijc.org/rel/
agree/water.html. The treaty, although originally between the United States and Great Britain,
now applies to Canada as it had to Great Britain. Id.
356. See infra Part IV.C.2 (discussing the role of the International Joint Commission under
the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909).
357. See La Paz Agreement, supra note 354, art. 2 (agreeing to reduce and eliminate
sources of transboundary pollution to the fullest extent practicable); id. art. 6 (instructing the
parties to consider various legal, institutional, and technical measures to implement the
agreement, including EIA); id. art. 7 (instructing the parties to assess projects that may have
significant environmental impacts on the border area so appropriate measures may be
considered to avoid or mitigate those impacts).
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the border region.35 8 Given the La Paz Agreement's relative failure for its
intended purpose, there seems little likelihood that it would be any more
successful in implementing an expanded mandate.
2. The International Joint Commission of the Boundary Waters Treaty
The International Joint Commission (UC) is an independent, bilateral
organization that was established by the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909.
359
The UC's "purpose is to help prevent and resolve disputes relating to the use
and quality of boundary waters and to advise Canada and the United States on
related questions. ' 36 The UC is composed of six members-three appointed
by the President of the United States with the advice of the Senate and three
appointed by the Governor in Council of Canada on the advice of the Prime
Minister-as well as numerous boards.36'
The IC's original purpose concerned surface waters: "Many rivers and
some of the largest lakes in the world lie along, or flow across, the border
between the United States and Canada. The International Joint Commission
assists governments in finding solutions to problems in these waters.
3 62
However, the IC has also taken a role in air pollution because of the impact air
pollution can have when it falls on rivers or lakes. 363 This is consistent with the
IC's "ecosystem" approach, which recognizes that "[e]very part of the
ecosystem-the air and land, the lakes, rivers and streams, plant life, wildlife
and humans---depends on the other parts for its own health."36 Under the 1991
Canada-United States Air Quality Agreement, the IJC can investigate air
pollution problems in boundary regions and invite public comments on the
reports of the Air Quality Committee established under the Air Quality
Agreement.365
358. See, e.g., Sanchez, supra note 7, at 112 (discussing the "low level of cooperation and
management achieved" by the La Paz Agreement).
359. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 355, arts. III, VII.
360. International Joint Commission, Who We Are, http://www.ijc.org/en/background/
biogr_commiss.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2006); see also Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note
355, arts. III, VII-XH (creating the International Joint Commission and establishing its
authority and responsibilities).
361. International Joint Commission, What It Is, How It Works, http://www.ijc.org/en/
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There are two major limitations to the UC's powers in the context of
transboundary environmental impacts in North America. First, the UC was
created only to deal with the specific issues involving boundary waters.
Although its mandate has been expanded, the treaty on which its authority is
based was signed so long ago that much of the understanding of transboundary
environmental impacts that gave rise to the treaty is now outdated.367 The
second and even more obvious problem is that the treaty is solely between the
United States and Canada.368 In order to be effective for addressing the
transboundary concerns that may arise under NAFTA, the treaty would need to
apply to all three member nations.
D. Implementation Through NAFTA: The Commission for Environmental
Cooperation
The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(NAAEC), also known as the environmental side agreement to the NAFTA,
was signed in 1993 369 The NAAEC and the corollary side agreement on labor
were the result of intense lobbying and commitments by then presidential
candidate Bill Clinton that NAFTA must include such provisions. 370 At base,
the purpose of the NAAEC is to ensure that the environmental goals of NAFTA
are accomplished. 37' To that end, the NAAEC's objectives include increasing
cooperation between the parties on environmental matters, promoting
sustainable development, fostering protection and improvement of the
environment in the three countries, enhancing compliance and enforcement of
environmental laws, and promoting transparency and public participation.372 In
order to effectively achieve these goals, the NAAEC established the
Commission on Environmental Cooperation (CEC), whose council is composed
of the cabinet-level environmental officials from the three nations-the
Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection Agency, the
366. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 355, pmbl., preliminary art.
367. See id. art. 1 (noting that the original purpose of the treaty was to ensure that
boundary waters remained viable for navigation and commerce and that the Boundary Waters
Treaty and the IC only began being applied to transboundary environmental concerns much
later).
368. See id. pmbl. (stating that originally the treaty was between the United States and
Great Britain, acting on behalf of the Dominion of Canada).
369. NAAEC, supra note 26.
370. MCGRAw, supra note 9, at 15.
371. NAAEC, supra note 26, art. 1.
372. Id.
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Canadian Minister for the Environment, and the Mexican Secretary for
Environment and Natural Resources.
373
One of the most well known aspects of the CEC is its citizen submission
process. Under NAAEC article 14, the Secretariat of the CEC can consider a
submission from any individual or nongovernmental organization asserting that
one of the countries is failing to effectively enforce its environmental law.374 If
the submission conforms with the requirements set out in article 14 and the
Secretariat finds that the submission warrants developing a factual record, it
presents it to the Council.37 5 If the Council approves the preparation of a
factual record by a two-thirds vote, then the Secretariat proceeds with the
preparation of the factual record.37 6
The factual record is essentially a report that investigates the allegations of
the submission.3 77 The Secretariat is not acting as an arbitrator on the
submission, so the factual record does not make a decision on the validity of the
allegations of the submission; rather it relies on the power of the information
once it is brought to light in such a public forum to bring the parties into
conformity with the requirements of law. If approved by the Council, the
factual record is made public.378 What is interesting about the submission
process in the context of this Note are the similarities the process has to EIA
procedures: both involve the investigation of environmental harms and the
presentation of that information to both the decisionmaker and the general
public. Similar to NEPA, neither process requires any particular outcome, only
that the issues involved be investigated and brought to the decisionmaker's and
public's attention. What, if anything, then happens is left to the decisionmaker
and the public.
The NAAEC contains provisions calling for the issue of TEIA to be
addressed, but those original intentions have apparently foundered. Article
10(7) of the NAAEC required the CEC to develop recommendations for a
procedure to address the transboundary environmental effects of a proposed
project within three years of the signing of the NAAEC. 379 Although the CEC
373. Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Who We Are, http://www.cec.org/who-
weare/council/index.cfm?varlan=english (last visited Jan. 14, 2006).
374. NAAEC, supra note 26, art. 14.
375. Id. art. 15(1).
376. Id. art. 15(2).
377. Id. art. 15(4)-(6).
378. Id. art. 15(7).
379. Id. art. 10(7). NAAEC states:
Recognizing the significant bilateral nature of many transboundary environmental
issues, the Council shall, with a view to agreement between the Parties pursuant to
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produced draft principles for TEIA, twelve years after the signing of the
NAAEC and eight years after the producing the draft principles, North America
is virtually no closer to having a uniform TEIA mechanism.
380
The objectives of the NAAEC provide support for environmental
assessment of transboundary environmental impacts.381 The Preamble
specifically
[r]eaffirm[s] the sovereign right of States to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental and development policies and their
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do
not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction.
382
Further, while not specifically referencing transboundary impacts, one of the
general obligations required by the NAAEC is appropriate assessment of
383environmental impacts.
In addition, one of the specific goals of the CEC is to "promote and
facilitate cooperation between the Parties with respect to environmental
matters."384  The CEC has the authority to develop recommendations on
"transboundary and border environmental issues, such as the long-range
transport of air and marine pollutants. '3 85 Specifically, as mentioned above,
one of the requirements of the NAAEC is that, within three years, the CEC
would develop recommendations with respect to assessing the environmental
impact of proposed projects that are likely to cause significant adverse
transboundary effects.386 The CEC was also required to consider and, if
this Article within three years on obligations, consider and develop
recommendations with respect to: (a) assessing the environmental impact of
proposed projects subject to decisions by a competent government authority and
likely to cause significant adverse transboundary effects, including a full evaluation
of comments provided by Parties and persons of other Parties; (b) notification,
provision of relevant information and consultation between Parties with respect to
such projects; and (c) mitigation of the potential adverse effects of such projects.
Id.
380. See Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Draft North American Agreement
on Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment, http://www.cec.org/pubsinfo-resources/
lawtreat-agree/pbl.cfm?varlan=english (last visited Jan. 14, 2006) [hereinafter Draft NA
TEIA]. No further action has been taken to implement these recommendations.
381. NAAEC, supra note 26, art. 1 (particularly (a), (c), & (j)).
382. Id. pmbl. (emphasis added).
383. Id. art. 2(1)(e).
384. Id. art. 10(l)(f).
385. Id. art. 10(2)(g).
386. Id. art. 10(7).
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appropriate, develop recommendations for reciprocal access to other parties'
courts and administrative agencies for citizens who have suffered or are likely
to suffer damage from pollution originating from the territory of that party.
387
The CEC did indeed study these issues and, in accordance with article
10(7), produced recommendations in 1997 entitled Draft North American
Agreement on Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment (Draft
Agreement). 388 At that time, the Council stated that "[d]uring the coming
months government representatives from all three countries will hold
negotiations to develop a legally binding agreement on [TEIA]" based on the
CEC's recommendations. 389  In 1997, the Council considered expert
recommendations on TEIA and determined that a legally binding agreement
should be brought into effect by April 15, 1998. 39
The Draft Agreement proposed by the CEC is well developed and it is
unclear why the issue has not progressed further. Although certain sections had
not been completed in the Draft Agreement, most of the major aspects of the
EIA process have been addressed. 391 The aspects that had been completed in
the Draft Agreement included many of what were likely to be the most
contentious issues, including the definition of environmental impact,392 the
types of activities that require notification of the potentially affected party,
393
what information is required in the notification,39 what actions will trigger an
EIA,395 what information sharing must occur and what rights to public
participation arise,39 6 the factors used to determine if transboundary impacts are
significant, 397 and the content that must be included in the transboundary
EIA.398  Despite the progress that was made on developing the Draft
387. Id. art. 10(9).
388. Draft NA TEIA, supra note 380, expert group recommendations.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Compare id. arts. 14-20 (articles fourteen through twenty and appendix I-covering
mitigation, post-project monitoring, exemptions, relation to existing bilateral obligations, on-
going consultations, dispute resolution, and general principles-were not completed in the Draft
Agreement) with id. arts. 1-13, apps. I-IV (articles one through thirteen and the four
appendices-covering most of the major aspects of EIA-were completed or largely completed
in the Draft Agreement).
392. Id. art. 1.
393. ld. art. 2.
394. Id. art. 7.
395. Id. art. 10.
396. Id. arts. 11-12.
397. Id. app. III.
398. Id. app. IV.
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Agreement, no further progress has been made since 1997.399 Given that nearly
all of the central features of EIA had been developed in the Draft Agreement, it
is unclear why no further progress has been made.
V. Implementing a Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment
Mechanism Under NAFTA
Although the momentum to produce a North American TEIA mechanism
seems to have faded, the need for a North American TEIA is as strong now as it
was in 1993. In the Preface to its 2002 State of the Environment Report, the
CEC "confirms that these three countries together make up an incredibly
complex, dynamic, and interconnected ecosystem";4°° "emphasizes the
importance of developing mutually compatible economic, social, and
environmental goals and policies across the three-country region" ;401 and notes
that "[m]any ecological connections link the countries of North America,"
including "transboundary air and water pollution."40 2 Air and water quality are
the two environmental issues that will most often raise transboundary concerns,
although other shared resources, such as migratory fish and wildlife, also
deserve attention. °3
Americans and Canadians have an "ecological footprint" more than three
times the world average. 4°4 As a result, Canada and the United States "now
either deplete their local natural capital stocks or import their missing
ecological capacity, or both.' ' 5  As Richard Lazarus discusses, even if
environmentally harmful activities can be exported to another country, that does
not prevent the environmental harm from affecting the United States or harmful
products from being imported back into the United States. 4°6 Environmental
harm can return to the United States as part of a consumer product, or an
industrial facility can emit pollutants that enter the air or water and are
399. Id. expert group recommendations.
400. NORTH AMERICAN MosAic, supra note 1, at iv.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. See id. at 2 (discussing how liberalized trade has increased cross-border movement of
capital, labor, information, and products, and deepened economic and cultural ties, and
discussing how this closer relationship has provided additional avenues for addressing
transboundary pollution and managing connections in migratory species).
404. Id. at 3-4. "Ecological footprint" refers to the land and water area required to produce
the natural resources and services and absorb all the waste generated per person. Id.
405. d. at 4.
406. LAzARUS, supra note 25, at 220-22.
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transported back into the United States. 407 As a result, "[a]nimal and plant
species, many much older than [humans], are going extinct at unprecedented
rates, often because of decisions and actions taken by humans half a world
away. "408
Similarly, the arguments in support of the NAAEC and CEC as the
mechanism for implementing a North American TEIA are as strong as they
were in 1993. The mechanism of TEIA allows the decisionmaking agency and
the public to become apprised of the environmental consequences of actions
and can result in positive environmental choices. And, in comparison to laws
with substantive requirements, information disclosure laws are much easier to
pass because they do not restrict the decisions that can be made, yet are
nonetheless very effective in deterring environmental harm.4°9 Because of the
environmental concerns described above, and particularly in the context of
ensuring that the level playing field intended by NAFTA is not subverted by
transboundary environmental externalities, a TEIA mechanism is needed for
North America. As discussed above, implementation of TEIA in North
America is most logically achieved by the CEC, simply by fulfillment of its
original obligation to address TEIA.
One of the biggest obstacles to implementing a TEIA process within any
context-and certainly within the North American context-is the legitimate
concern that adopting a multilateral agreement will result in the parties ceding
some degree of national sovereignty to the international community.41 Indeed,
these concerns apply not only in the environmental field, but to any multilateral
issue.41' In general, an international obligation to prevent environmental harm
407. Id. at 227.
408. NORTH AMERICAN MosAIc, supra note 1, at 3.
409. See LAZARUS, supra note 25, at 186 (discussing how information disclosure
requirements are more politically feasible than are laws with substantive requirements because
they encourage intelligent decisionmaking, without requiring a particular result, thus they do not
readily generate political opposition); id. at 85-87 (discussing the substantial changes in agency
behavior and positive environmental effects that NEPA's information disclosure requirement
has resulted in and discussing generally the power of information disclosure).
410. See id. at 147 (discussing the tendency of many nations-including the United
States-to resist the loss of sovereignty implicit in international environmental treaties and
noting the United States' choice not to join the Law of the Sea Convention or the Biodiversity
Convention at the 1992 Earth Summit and Congress's choice not to implement, despite
ratifying, the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous
Waste); see also Knox, supra note 33, at 201 (noting that the simplest reason why TEIA does
not exist already between the United States and Canada is federalism, specifically that in both
countries only projects carried out by the federal governments are subject to EIA).
411. See, e.g., Christopher McGrath, Today's Transnational Crime Epidemic: The
Necessity of an International Criminal Court to Battle Misdeeds Which Transcend National
Borders, 6 D.C.LJ. INT'LL. &PRAc. 135,148-53 (1997) (discussing the sovereignty concerns
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to other nations requires that some degree of the control a nation has over
developments occurring within its borders will be ceded to other nations or to
supranational institutions.41 2 Additionally, a new TEIA mechanism will have to
be reconciled with, or preempt to some degree, the domestic environmental
impact assessment mechanisms.
The solution to these concerns is simply balancing the scope and authority
given to the CEC for implementing TEIA that Canada, Mexico, and the United
States find acceptable. Given that forty nations have been able to agree on such
a balance and ratify the Espoo Treaty, the ability of three nations-whose
economic and political systems are already considerably interwoven-to strike
such a balance seems achievable. 413 If the parties to NAFTA agree on a TEIA
mechanism that-as recommended by this Note-does not have any
substantive requirements, but only requires information disclosure similar to
NEPA, the amount of sovereign control that will be ceded to the CEC is
minimal.414 Furthermore, given that the CEC already implements a system-
the citizen submission process-with considerable similarity to the information
disclosure requirements of EIA, the additional degree of control that would be
ceded is also minimal.41 5 Indeed, in many respects a TEIA process would be
analogous to a prospective, rather than retrospective, citizen submission
process.
One issue that would have to be resolved is what occurs when there are
both domestic and transboundary harms. Specifically, does domestic EIA or
TEIA apply? One solution would be to grant concurrent jurisdiction to the
TEIA process. This, however, would pose the potential for unnecessary
that arise when proposing an international criminal court and suggesting that concurrent
jurisdiction is a method for avoiding this concern). Interestingly, McGrath proposes that an
interim solution-before an international criminal court is viable--could be a solution that is
limited to the Americas. Id.
412. See Franz Xaver Perrez, The Relationship Between "Permanent Sovereignty" and the
Obligation Not To Cause Transboundary Environmental Damage, 26 ENVTL. L. 1187, 1189
(1996) ("[W]hile each state has permanent sovereignty over its natural resources, each state also
has an obligation not to cause transboundary environmental damage."); id. at 1187 ("It is often
argued that a state's sovereignty, as one of the fundamental principles of public international
law, limits a state's international environmental obligations."). Perrez, however, contends that
rather than limiting a state's international environmental obligation, permanent sovereignty
carries with it an inherent duty of nonintervention into the sovereign realm of other states. Id.
413. See Espoo Participants, supra note 345 (listing the nations that have ratified the Espoo
Treaty).
414. See supra Part III (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation that NEPA has
strictly procedural requirements).
415. See supra Part IV.D (discussing the CEC's citizen submission process). Under the
citizen submission process, the CEC has broad powers to investigate environmental harms in
each of the three parties to NAFr7A. Id.
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duplication of the assessment. A second option would be to have domestic EIA
apply to cases with both domestic and transboundary harm, but with the
requirement that, alongside its consideration of domestic harms, the EIA must
consider transboundary harms in accordance with the requirements of the
CEC's TEIA process. Under this option, however, it would be exceedingly
unlikely that TEIA would ever apply, as the circumstances in which there
would only be transboundary harm and not domestic harm (or not domestic
harm significant enough to trigger a domestic EIA) would be quite rare.
A final option would be that the TEIA process could apply and preempt
domestic EIA in all cases in which there was significant transboundary effect.
This has the advantage of assuring that all cases in which there are
transboundary harms will be subjected to a uniform environmental assessment.
This approach has two disadvantages. First, there would be a greater transfer of
sovereign control to the CEC than either of the first options (although perhaps
only minimally). Second, a larger institutional infrastructure in the CEC would
be required to deal with the larger numbers of TEIAs it would be administering.
These issues, however, could certainly be resolved if the three nations
reaffirmed their support for TEIA in North America.
VI. Conclusion
The potential for transboundary harm is a serious concern in North
America. It is of particular concern because exporting environmental harm can
result in the equivalent of a subsidy on the activity causing the environmental
harm at the expense of the receiving nation. Transboundary harm thus changes
the cost of doing business for the economic activities that create the
transboundary harm. In the context of NAFTA such changes in the cost of
business are of particular concern because they result in exactly the type of
trade distortions that NAFTA was intended to eliminate or reduce.
Given that transboundary harm is a concern in North America, the
question is then how to best address it. Because the domestic EIA laws of the
three member nations are sufficiently different and currently have little
application in the transboundary context, they are not ideal mechanisms to
address transboundary harm. International legal regimes such as the ILC's
Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm or the Espoo Treaty
are both promising developments in the prevention of transboundary harm, but
their implementation in the near future seems unlikely and their global scope
has resulted in provisions that are not necessarily ideal for North America.
Another option is the extension of existing bilateral agreements to include
910 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 849 (2006)
provisions for transboundary EIA. Because these agreements are bilateral
rather than trilateral and their original purpose was not TEIA, they too are not
ideal solutions. A final option is implementing transboundary EIA under
NAFTA itself through its existing environmental agency, the CEC.
This Note concludes that implementation of transboundary EIA through
the CEC is the most logical solution to assessment of transboundary
environmental harm in North America. The CEC's original purpose included
developing a TEIA protocol for North America, so the CEC is familiar with the
issue. The CEC is also already a trilateral organization, so fewer structural
changes will be needed to enable the CEC to address TEIA. Furthermore, one
of the CEC's existing functions, the citizen submission procedure, bears
considerable similarities to EIA procedures. In combination these factors
would enable the CEC to adapt relatively easily to effectively implement TEIA
in North America in a manner consistent with the purposes of NAFTA.
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